Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'There Are No Abstract Objects' and 'A Priori Knowledge'

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta

14596	Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr]
	Full Idea: Just as there are no numbers or properties, there are no relations (like 'being heavier than' or 'betweenness'), or sets. I will provisionally use 'nominalism' for the conjunction of these four claims.
	From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 1)
	A reaction: If you are going to be a nominalist, do it properly! My starting point in metaphysics is strong sympathy with this view. Right now [Tues 22nd Nov 2011, 10:57 am GMT] I think it is correct.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism

14597	Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]
	Full Idea: Natural Class Nominalists take as primitive the notion of a 'natural' class - a class of things that all resemble one another in some one respect and resemble nothing else in that respect.
	From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
	A reaction: Dorr rejects this view because he doesn't believe in 'classes'. How committed to classes do you have to be before you are permitted to talk about them? All vocabulary (such as 'resemble') seems metaphysically tainted in this area.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity

20475	Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo]
	Full Idea: Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods.
	From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
	A reaction: I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible.

14598	Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr]
	Full Idea: If there are abstract objects, there are necessary truths about these things that cannot be reduced to truths of logic. So only the nominalist, who denies that there are any such things, can adequately respect the idea that there are no brute necessities.
	From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
	A reaction: This is where two plates of my personal philosophy grind horribly against one another. I love nominalism, and I love natural necessities. They meet like a ring-species in evolution. I'll just call it a 'paradox', and move on (swiftly).

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary

20476	If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
	Full Idea: If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former.
	From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
	A reaction: This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori

20471	Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo]
	Full Idea: There are three suggested epistemic conditions on a priori knowledge: the first regards the source of justification, the second regards the defeasibility of justification, and the third appeals to the strength of justification.
	From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2)
	A reaction: [compressed] He says these are all inspired by Kant. The non-epistemic suggested condition involve necessity or analyticity. The source would have to be entirely mental; the defeasibly could not be experiential; the strength would be certainty.

20477	The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo]
	Full Idea: The leading claim of proponents of the a priori is that sources of justification are of two significantly different types: experiential and nonexperiential. Initially this difference is marked at the phenomenological level.
	From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 5)
	A reaction: He cites Plantinga and Bealer for the phenomenological starting point (that some knowledge just seems rationally obvious, certain, and perhaps necessary).

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

20472	Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo]
	Full Idea: There is reason to view non-epistemic analyses of a priori knowledge (in terms of necessity or analyticity) with suspicion. The a priori concerns justification. Analysis by necessity or analyticity concerns the proposition rather than the justification.
	From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2.1)
	A reaction: [compressed] The fact that the a priori is entirely a mode of justification, rather than a type of truth, is the modern view, influenced by Kripke. Given that assumption, this is a good objection.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility

20474	'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo]
	Full Idea: A justified belief that a proposition is not true is an 'overriding' defeater, ...and the belief that a justification is inadequate or defective is an 'undermining' defeater.
	From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], n 40)
	A reaction: Sounds more like a sliding scale than a binary option. Quite useful, though.