Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Should a materialist believe in qualia?' and 'Prescriptivism'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia

8209	Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The concept of qualia (a part of the folk concept) is the concept of properties of experiences apt for causing abilities to recognize and to imagine experiences of the same type.
	From: David Lewis (Should a materialist believe in qualia? [1995], p.327)
	A reaction: I presume the other part of the folk concept would be what it is about qualia that makes this possible, namely that they 'look/sound/feel.. the same'. Lewis emphasises the functional aspect, which could not possibly be the whole story.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism

2854	Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]
	Full Idea: Prescriptivism holds that if you think one 'ought' to do a certain kind of act, and yet you are not committed to doing that act in the relevant circumstances, then you either spoke insincerely, or are using the word 'ought' in a weak sense.
	From: Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640)
	A reaction: So that's an 'ought', but not a 'genuine ought', then? (No True Scotsman move). Someone ought to rescue that drowning child, but I can't be bothered.

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule

2856	Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B]
	Full Idea: Prescriptivity is especially important if moral judgements are universalizable, for then we can employ golden rule-style reasoning ('do as you would be done by').
	From: Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640)