Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain' and 'works'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory

15661	Horkheimer's critical theory was interdisciplinary, and aware of its own context and function [Horkheimer, by Finlayson]
	Full Idea: Horkheimer was chiefly responsible for developing 'critical theory' during the 1930s. ...It was interdisciplinary, reflective, dialectical, and critical. It reflected on the social context that gave rise to it, and its own function within that society.
	From: report of Max Horkheimer (works [1950]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.1:02

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism

7444	Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The materialist theory Armstrong and I proposed joins claims of type-type psychophysical identity with a behaviourist or functionalist way of characterising mental states such as pain.
	From: David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §III)
	A reaction: Armstrong has backed off from 'type-type' identity, because the realisations of a given mental state might be too diverse to be considered of the same type. Putnam's machine functionalism allows the possibility of dualism.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind

7445	The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The word 'pain' is a non-rigid designator; it is a contingent matter what state the concept and the word apply to. (Note: so the sort of theory Kripke argues against is not what we propose).
	From: David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §III)
	A reaction: I like the view that a given quale is necessarily identical to a given mental state, but that many mental states might occupy a given behavioural role. The smell of roses might occupy the behavioural role of pain. Frog pain isn't quite like ours.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability

7443	A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG]
	Full Idea: To pass our test it seems that our theory will have to be a 'mixed' theory, to account for the Madman (whose pain has odd causes, and odd effects) and also for the Martian (who has normal causes and effects, but an odd physical state).
	From: report of David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §II) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: A statement that 'pain' is ambiguous (qualia/causal role) would help a lot here. Martians have the causal role but no qualia, and the madman has the qualia but lacks the causal role. I say lots of different qualia might have the same causal role.