Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Two Problems for Essentialism' and 'Some Puzzles of Ground'

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5 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic

14263	Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Under strong Kleene tables, a disjunction will be true if one of the disjuncts is true, regardless of whether or not the other disjunct has a truth-value; under the weak table it is required that the other disjunct also have a value. So for other cases.
	From: Kit Fine (Some Puzzles of Ground [2010], n7)
	A reaction: [see also p.111 of Fine's article] The Kleene tables seem to be the established form of modern three-valued logic, with the third value being indeterminate.

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding

14262	Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The general formal principles of grounding are Transitivity (A«B, B«C/A«C: if A helps ground B and B helps C, then A helps C), Irreflexivity (A«A/absurd: A can't ground itself) and Factivity (A«B/A; A«/B: for grounding both A and B must be the case).
	From: Kit Fine (Some Puzzles of Ground [2010], 4)

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism

5492	How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: In Newtonian physics the distance between two objects determines the attractive forces between them, but then the objects will have to be sensitive to the distance, in order to 'know' what forces to generate; but distance isn't a causal power.
	From: David M. Armstrong (Two Problems for Essentialism [2001], p.170)
	A reaction: Ellis replies that he is not troubled, because he believes in essential properties which are separate from their causal roles. Indeed, how else could you explain their causal roles? Still, distance must be mentioned when explaining gravity.