Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity' and 'Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
9390 Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
     A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
     Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category.
     From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26
     A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9389 Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
     A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23674 If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid]
     Full Idea: If a man should give to his neighbour a potion which he really believes will poison him, but which, in the event, proves salutary, and does much good; in moral estimation, he is a poisoner, and not a benefactor.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
     A reaction: I take Reid to mean that morality concerns how we assess the agent, and not the results of his actions. Mill and Bentham concede that we judge people this way, but don't think morality mainly concerns judging people.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
23675 We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid]
     Full Idea: It is a first principle of morals, that we ought not to do to another what we should think wrong to be done to us in like circumstances.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 6)
     A reaction: This negative form of the rule is more plausible than the positive form, presumably because there is more consensus about what we all dislike than what we all prefer. But presents for people that they would like, not that you like.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
23672 To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid]
     Full Idea: A man cannot be virtuous, if he has no regard to duty.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
     A reaction: Thus are Aristotle and Kant united in a simple sentence. Aristotle thinks that a virtuous person thereby sees what is the right thing to do, but I take 'duty' to imply a requirement which comes not from good character but from external society.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
23673 Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid]
     Full Idea: I presume it will be granted, that, in every man of real worth, there is a principle of honour, a regard to what is honourable or dishonourable, very distinct from a regard to his interest.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
     A reaction: Note that there is a 'principle' of honour in a person's character, and there are also actions which are intrinsically honourable or not. I fear that only the worthy are honourable, and only the honourable are worthy!