Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Two Kinds of Possibility' and 'Liberalism and the Limits of Justice'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
     A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
     A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington]
     Full Idea: In my view, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], Abs)
     A reaction: My immediate reaction is that epistemic necessity is not necessity at all. 'For all I know' 2 plus 2 might really be 95, and squares may also be circular.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
     Full Idea: Metaphysical necessity derives from distinguishing things which can happen and things which can't, in virtue of their nature, which we discover empirically: the metaphysically possible, I claim, is constrained by the laws of nature.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I)
     A reaction: She claims that Kripke is sympathetic to this. Personally I like the idea that natural necessity is metaphysically necessary (see 'Scientific Essentialism'), but the other way round comes as a bit of a surprise. I will think about it.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington]
     Full Idea: So-called broadly logical necessity (by which I mean, not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I)
     A reaction: This is controversial, and is criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. Fine argues that 'narrow' (formal) logical necessity is metaphysical. Between them they have got rid of logical necessity completely.
An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington]
     Full Idea: Validity is governed by epistemic necessity, i.e. an argument is valid if and only if there is an a priori route from premises to conclusion.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §V)
     A reaction: Controversial, and criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. I don't think I agree with her. I don't see validity as depending on dim little human beings.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Choosers in the 'original position' have been stripped of most human characteristics [Sandel, by Tuckness/Wolf]
     Full Idea: Sandel argues that people in the 'original position' have been stripped of everything that makes them recognisably human: their conceptions of the good, their nationality, family membership, religion, friendships and past histories.
     From: report of Michael J. Sandel (Liberalism and the Limits of Justice [1982]) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 4 'Communitarian'
     A reaction: This draws attention to what a pure Enlightenment rational project Rawls is pursuing, in the spirit if Kant's ethics. Choosers in the original position become identical, and thus choose a homogeneous society.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The self is 'unencumbered' if it can abandon its roles and commitments without losing identity [Sandel, by Shorten]
     Full Idea: Sandel says liberals are committed to the 'unencumbered self', ..when it has no roles, commitments or projects that are 'so essential that turning away from them would call into question the person I am'.
     From: report of Michael J. Sandel (Liberalism and the Limits of Justice [1982], p.86) by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 02
     A reaction: This is a very penetrating criticism of liberalism. The liberal self that makes social and legal contracts and exercises basic political rights is not far from being a robot. It has the minimum needed to join a society. Belonging is quite different.