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All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'works' and 'fragments/reports'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology

3348	If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA on Husserl]
	Full Idea: Sternly envisaged by Husserl as a scientific discipline, phenomenology, on being stripped of the synthetic a priori by the logical positivists, ends up in Sartre as a largely literary undertaking.
	From: comment on Edmund Husserl (works [1898]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.18

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism

604	Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle]
	Full Idea: Lycophron has it that knowledge is the 'cohabitation' (rather than participation or synthesis) of knowing and the soul.
	From: report of Lycophron (fragments/reports [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1045b
	A reaction: This sounds like a rather passive and inert relationship. Presumably knowing something implies the possibility of acting on it.