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9390
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Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
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Full Idea:
Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
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From:
Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
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A reaction:
There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.
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9389
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Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
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Full Idea:
Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
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From:
Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
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A reaction:
I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.
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16625
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In hylomorphism all the explanation of actions is in the form, and the matter doesn't do anything [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
Prime, common matter seems to be a kind of accessory and to stand as a substratum, whereas any kind of action seems to be a mere emanation of form. So it is that forms are given all the leading parts.
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From:
Francis Bacon (Philosophical Studies 1611-19 [1617], p.206), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.2
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A reaction:
This is a very striking criticism of hylomorphism. The revolution was simple - that actually matter seems to do all the real work, and the form can take a back seat.
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