9390
|
Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
|
|
Full Idea:
Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
|
|
From:
Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
|
|
A reaction:
There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.
|
9389
|
Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
|
|
Full Idea:
Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
|
|
From:
Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
|
|
A reaction:
I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.
|
20166
|
A man is a responsible agent to the extent he has an intention, and knows what he is doing [Hampshire]
|
|
Full Idea:
A man becomes more and more a free and responsible agent the more he at all times knows what he is doing, in every sense of this phrase, and the more he acts with a definite and clearly formed intention.
|
|
From:
Stuart Hampshire (Thought and Responsibility [1960], p.178), quoted by John Kekes - The Human Condition 07.1
|
|
A reaction:
Kekes quote this (along with Frankfurt, Hart etc) as the 'received view' of responsibility, which he attacks.
|