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All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion' and 'Explanation and Reference'

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15 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity

9161	Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
	Full Idea: It is not out of the question to hold that without circular justifications there is no reasonableness at all. That is the view of a certain kind of coherence theorist.
	From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 2)
	A reaction: This nicely captures a gut feeling I have had for a long time. Being now thoroughly converted to coherentism, I am drawn to the idea - like a moth to a flame. But how do we distinguish cuddly circularity from its cruel and vicious cousin?

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

17505	Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
	Full Idea: The important thing about proper names is that it would be ridiculous to think that having linguistic competence can be equated in their case with knowledge of a necessary and sufficient condition.
	From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], II B)

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

11908	Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
	Full Idea: The only place for essentialism to come from in Putnam's semantic account is out of the 'same kind' relation. But if the same kind relation can be cashed out in terms that do not involve sharing properties (apart from 'being water') there is a gap.
	From: comment on Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 10.4
	A reaction: [This is the criticism of Salmon and Mellor] See Mackie's discussion for details. I would always have thought that relations result from essences, so could never be used to define them.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason

9160	Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
	Full Idea: Propositions such as 'People usually tell the truth' seem to count as default reasonable, but it is odd to count them as a priori. Empirical indefeasibility seems the obvious way to distinguish those default reasonable propositions that are a priori.
	From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 1)
	A reaction: Sounds reasonable, but it would mean that all the uniformities of nature would then count as a priori. 'Every physical object exerts gravity' probably has no counterexamples, but doesn't seem a priori (even if it is necessary). See Idea 9164.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention

9164	We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
	Full Idea: I argue not that our most basic rules are a priori or empirically indefeasible, but that we treat them as empirically defeasible and indeed a priori; we don't regard anything as evidence against them.
	From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 4)
	A reaction: This is the fictionalist view of a priori knowledge (and of most other things, such as mathematics). I can't agree. Most people treat heaps of a posteriori truths (like the sun rising) as a priori. 'Mass involves energy' is indefeasible a posteriori.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge

9165	Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
	Full Idea: Reliability is not a 'factual property'; in calling a rule reasonable we are evaluating it, and all that makes sense to ask about is what we value. We place a high value on the reliability of our inductive and perceptual rules that lead to truth.
	From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 5)
	A reaction: This doesn't seem to be a contradiction of reliabilism, since truth is a pretty widespread epistemological value. If you do value truth, then eyes are pretty reliable organs for attaining it. Reliabilism is still wrong, but not for this reason.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism

9162	Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
	Full Idea: Reliability is not all we want in an inductive rule. Completely reliable methods are available, such as believing nothing, or only believing logical truths. But we don't value them, but value less reliable methods with other characteristics.
	From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 3)
	A reaction: I would take this excellent point to be an advertisement for inference to the best explanation, which requires not only reliable inputs of information, but also a presiding rational judge to assess the mass of evidence.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism

9166	People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
	Full Idea: We should concede that different people have slightly different basic epistemological standards. ..I doubt that any clear sense could be given to the notion of 'correctness' here.
	From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 5)
	A reaction: I think this is dead right. There is a real relativism about knowledge, which exists at the level of justification, rather than of truth. The scientific revolution just consisted of making the standards tougher, and that seems to have been a good idea.

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science

17508	Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
	Full Idea: Scientists are not trying to maximise some formal property of 'simplicity'; they are trying to maximise truth.
	From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], III B)
	A reaction: This seems to be aimed at the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws of nature, as the simplest axioms of experience. I'm with Putnam (as he was at this date).

14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction

9163	If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
	Full Idea: If some inductive rule is basic for us, in the sense that we never assess it using any rules other than itself, then it must be one that we treat as empirically indefeasible (hence as fully a priori, given that it will surely have default status).
	From: Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 4)
	A reaction: This follows on from Field's account of a priori knowledge. See Ideas 9160 and 9164. I think of induction as simply learning from experience, but if experience goes mad I will cease to trust it. (A rationalist view).

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

17506	I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
	Full Idea: In previous papers I suggested that the reference is fixed by a test known to experts; it now seems to me that this is just a special case of my use being causally connected to an introducing event.
	From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], II C)
	A reaction: I think he was probably right the first time, and has now wandered off course.

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds

17507	Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
	Full Idea: Natural kinds can be associated with 'strong' stereotypes (giving a strong picture of a typical member, like a tiger), or with 'weak' stereotypes (with no idea of a sufficient condition, such as molybdenum or elm).
	From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], II C)

11904	Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]
	Full Idea: Putnam implies dispensing with the designation of natural kinds by singular terms in favour of the postulation of necessary but a posteriori connections between predicates. ...We might call this 'predicate essentialism', but not 'de re essentialism'.
	From: report of Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 10.1
	A reaction: It is characteristic of modern discussion that the logical form of natural kind statements is held to be crucial, rather than an account of nature in any old ways that do the job. So do I prefer singular terms, or predicate-connections. Hm.