Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'There is immediate Justification' and 'Psychology from an empirical standpoint'

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10 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs

8845	An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
	Full Idea: To say that experiences have propositional content is not to say that experiences are beliefs.
	From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §4)
	A reaction: This is important for opponents of foundationalism, because they will not allow a raw experience to act as a justification on its own. Even if concepts, or even propositions, are offered by experience, the crucial evaluation must preceded knowledge.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations

8842	The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor]
	Full Idea: The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but from considering examples, such as I have a headache, I am raising my arm, I am imagining my grandmother, or seeing how dominoes could fill a chessboard.
	From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §3)
	A reaction: Most of his examples depend on the fact that they cannot be challenged by anyone else, because they are within his own mind. The dominoes require complex thought. The first two could be erroneous if he was dreaming.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

8843	Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
	Full Idea: Pure coherentists claim that a belief can only be justified by its relations to other beliefs; impure coherentists are willing to give some non-beliefs, such as perceptual experiences, a justifying role.
	From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §4)
	A reaction: I think I would vote for the pure version. The distinction that is needed, I think, is between justification and evidence. You have to surmise causal links and explanations before you can see an experience as evidence, and then justification.

8844	Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
	Full Idea: The Master Argument for coherentism is the claim that a justifier requires asserted propositional content, and that only beliefs represent propositions assertively.
	From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §4)
	A reaction: I think this claim (which Pryor attacks) is correct. A key point is that almost any experience can be delusional, and in need of critical evaluation. We would even only accept an experience as being necessarily veridical after critical evaluation.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

8846	Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]
	Full Idea: If you have reasons for your belief, they should be considerations you could in principle cite, or give, to someone who doubted or challenged the belief. You can't give some else a non-propositional state like a headache.
	From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §6)
	A reaction: On the whole I agree, but if someone asked you to justify your claim that there is a beautiful sunset over the harbour, you could just say 'Look!'. Headaches are too private. The person must still see that the sunset is red, and not the window.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs

8847	Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor]
	Full Idea: Ordinarily we make no intentional choices about what to believe, but one can choose to believe something, and then seek ways to get oneself to believe it.
	From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §7)
	A reaction: Deliberately reading the articles of a philosopher that you seem to agree with would be an example. Presumably the belief that this is a good belief and should be given support is not itself voluntarily chosen. Ultimately we are helpless. See Idea 1854.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality

3364	All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano]
	Full Idea: Every mental phenomenon contains something as object within itself.
	From: Franz Brentano (Psychology from an empirical standpoint [1874], p. 88), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.21
	A reaction: This gives rise to the slogan that 'intentionality is the mark of the mental', which notoriously seems to miss out the phenomenal aspect of mental life. We note now, though, that even emotions have objects.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

3225	Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey]
	Full Idea: Brentano's thesis is that all mental phenomena are intentional i.e. representational. Support for this view is that assimilating phenomenal experience to attitudes we explain the essential unity of the mind.
	From: report of Franz Brentano (Psychology from an empirical standpoint [1874]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 11.5
	A reaction: Unifying intentionality and qualia in a single theory looks like a good move, but which one has priority? Evolutionary theory says priority goes to whatever produces behaviour. My intuition is that qualia are more basic - in tiny insects, say.