Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Constitutional Code I' and 'Relations'

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10 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
9390 Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
     A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21339 We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them [Heil]
     Full Idea: A satisfying account of relations must be ontologically serious. This means refusing to rest content with abstract specifications of relations as sets of ordered n-tuples.
     From: John Heil (Relations [2009], Intro)
     A reaction: A set of ordered entities would give the extension of a relation, which wouldn't, among other things, explain co-extensive relations (if all the people to my left were also taller than me). Heil's is a general cry from the heart about formal philosophy.
21349 Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties [Heil]
     Full Idea: If Simmias is taller than Socrates, they are indirectly related; they are related via their possession of properties that are themselves directly - and internally - related. Hence relational truths are made true by non-relational features of the world.
     From: John Heil (Relations [2009], 'Founding')
     A reaction: This seems to be a strategy for reducing external relations to internal relations, which are intrinsic to objects, which thus reduces the ontology. Heil is not endorsing it, but cites Kit Fine 2000. The germ of this idea is in Plato.
21340 Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations [Heil]
     Full Idea: A striking idea is that relations are ontologically primary: monadic, non-relational features of the world are constituted by relations. A view of this kind is defended by Peirce, and contemporary 'structural realists' like Ladyman.
     From: John Heil (Relations [2009], 'Relational')
     A reaction: I can't make sense of this proposal, which seems to offer relations with no relata. What is a relation? What is it made of? How do you individuate two instances of a relations, without reference to the relata?
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
21348 In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers [Heil]
     Full Idea: We might say that the truthmakers for 'six is greater than five' are six and five themselves. On this view, truthmakers for one class of relational truths are non-relational features of the world.
     From: John Heil (Relations [2009], 'Founding')
     A reaction: That seems to be a good way of expressing the existence of an internal relation.
21351 Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation [Heil]
     Full Idea: Truthmaking is a paradigmatic internal relation: if you have a truthbearer, a representation, and you have the world as the truthbearer represents it as being, you have truthmaking, you have the truthbearer's being true.
     From: John Heil (Relations [2009], 'Causal')
     A reaction: It is nice to have an example of an internal relation other than numbers, and closer to the concrete world. Is the relation between the world and facts about the world the same thing, or another example?
21344 If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R [Heil]
     Full Idea: A simple way to think about internal relations is: if R internally relates a and b, then, if you have a and b, you thereby have R. If you have six and you have five, you thereby have six's being greater than five.
     From: John Heil (Relations [2009], 'External')
     A reaction: This seems to work a lot better for abstracta than for physical objects, where I am struggling to think of a parallel example. Parenthood? Temporal relations between things? Acorn and oak?
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
21350 If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil]
     Full Idea: On the conception that properties are powers, it is no longer obvious that causal relations are external relations. Given the powers - all the powers in play - you have the manifestations.
     From: John Heil (Relations [2009], 'Causal')
     A reaction: This also delivers on a plate the necessity felt to be in causal relations, because the relation is inevitable once you are given the relata. But can you have an accidental (rather than essential) internal relation? Not in the case of numbers.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9389 Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
     A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
5271 Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham]
     Full Idea: Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and science of music and poetry.
     From: Jeremy Bentham (Constitutional Code I [1827], p.139), quoted by J.R. Dinwiddy - Bentham p.114
     A reaction: Mill quoted this with implied outrage, but Bentham was attacking public subsidies to the arts when he said it. It is a basic idea in the debate on pleasure - that pleasures are only distinguished by their intensity, not some other value.