Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'People and Their Bodies' and 'works'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought

7822	A neo-Stoic movement began in the late sixteenth century [Lipsius, by Grayling]
	Full Idea: A neo-Stoic movement began at the end of the sixteenth century, under the inspiration of the Dutch scholar Justus Lipsius.
	From: report of Justus Lipsius (works [1584]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.5
	A reaction: I would take this to be just as much a movement against Christianity as the interest in the less theistic Epicurus. They wanted the virtues of Christianity without the theological trappings.

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts

16209	How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires? [Thomson]
	Full Idea: Can one really think that point-duration temporal slices of bodies believe things or want things?
	From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (People and Their Bodies [1997], p.211), quoted by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 2.9 n21
	A reaction: There is a problem with a slice doing anything long-term. The bottom line is that things are said to 'endure', but that is precisely what time-slices are unable to do. Hawley rejects this idea.