Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'The Varieties of Necessity' and 'On Relations of Universals and Particulars'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience

16045	General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K]
	Full Idea: Russell noted that you cannot arrive at general facts by inference from numerous particular facts, ..but general facts logically supervene on particular ones. So the general facts supervene, but are not entailed.
	From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Relations of Universals and Particulars [1911]) by Karen Bennett - Supervenience §3.2
	A reaction: The belief that the general facts supervene on the particular ones then seems to be more a matter of faith than of fact. Or maybe it is analytic, depending on what we understand by 'general'. Universal, or generalised?

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes

14327	Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford]
	Full Idea: The trope theorist cannot explain how a number of tropes resemble each other.
	From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Relations of Universals and Particulars [1911]) by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 07.6
	A reaction: [My 13,000th Idea: 31/10/11] Every theory is left with something it cannot explain. Is it likely that we could come up with an explanation of resemblance? It seems like a combination of identity in the physics, and identity in the brain mechanisms.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity

9216	Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The three sources of necessity - the identity of things, the natural order, and the normative order - have their own peculiar forms of necessity. The three main areas of human enquiry - metaphysics, science and ethics - each has its own necessity.
	From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
	A reaction: I would treat necessity in ethics with caution, if it is not reducible to natural or metaphysical necessity. Fine's proposal is interesting, but I did not find it convincing, especially in its view that metaphysical necessity doesn't intrude into nature.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony

9214	Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: I may have good reason to believe some testimony, for example, even though the person providing the testimony has no good reason for saying what he does.
	From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 5)
	A reaction: Thus small children, madmen and dreamers may occasionally get things right without realising it. I take testimony to be merely one more batch of evidence which has to be assessed in building the most coherent picture possible.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

9215	Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: It would be harder to break P-and-Q implying P than the connection between cause and effect. This difference in strictness means it is more plausible that natural necessities include metaphysical necessities, than vice versa.
	From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
	A reaction: I cannot see any a priori grounds for the claim that causation is more easily disrupted than logic. It seems to be based on the strategy of inferring possibilities from what can be imagined, which seems to me to lead to wild misunderstandings.