Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'The Architecture of Mathematics' and 'Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations'

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10 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism

10190	From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics is a storehouse of abstract structures [Bourbaki]
	Full Idea: From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics appears as a storehouse of abstract forms - the mathematical structures.
	From: Nicholas Bourbaki (The Architecture of Mathematics [1950], 221-32), quoted by Fraser MacBride - Review of Chihara's 'Structural Acc of Maths' p.79
	A reaction: This seems to be the culmination of the structuralist view that developed from Dedekind and Hilbert, and was further developed by philosophers in the 1990s.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

8361	What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: It is not very natural to say of that which is true that it is also possible. ...What is true was possible - but whether it still is a potency of the world is not certain.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §5)
	A reaction: A simple and rather important distinction. Before encountering this, I would certainly have been happy to affirm that the actual is possible, but actually it may not be. The power to create differs from the power to sustain. Could God re-create the world?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation

8363	p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: What makes p a cause-factor relative to the effect-factor q (rather than vice versa) is the fact that by manipulating p, producing changes in it 'at will', we could bring about changes in q.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §8)
	A reaction: As a solution to the direction-of-causation problem, I suspect that this proposal is begging the question. Will a causal explanation be offered of the action of manipulation? If he mistook his manipulation for a cause when it is actually an effect...

8364	We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: Given our present knowledge of the laws of nature, we can imagine ways of controlling floods by controlling rainfall, but not the other way round. That is should be so, however, is contingent.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §8)
	A reaction: Despite my objections to Idea 8363, this is a good example. It won't establish the metaphysics of the direction of causation, though, because God might control rainfall by controlling floods. Maybe causation is more like a motorway pile-up than dominoes.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation

8366	The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: There is an implicit dependence of the very notion of a cause on a concept of agency and action.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §10)
	A reaction: This is because he thinks experimental intervention is the key to the concept of causation (see Ideas 8362 and 8363). Others go further, and say that the concept of causation arises from subjective experience of performing actions. I quite like that.

8362	We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: What confers on observed regularities the character of causal or nomic connections is the possibility of subjecting cause-factors to experimental test by interfering with the 'natural' course of events.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §7)
	A reaction: This is von Wright's distinctive proposal, making causation a feature of the culture of science, rather than of ordinary life. But see Idea 2461. Causation is becoming too epistemological for my taste. Either it is a feature of reality, or forget it.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation

8360	We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: We may be able to analyse causation into conditionship relations between events or states of affairs, ...but conditions cannot be regarded as logical primitives, ... and must be analysed into quantifiers, or modal concepts.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §2)
	A reaction: [very compressed] A nice illustration of the aim of analytical philosophy - to analyse the elements of reality down to logical primitives. This is the dream of Descartes and Leibniz, continued by Russell and co. Do we still have this aspiration?

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws

8365	Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv]
	Full Idea: Not all laws are causal 'experimentalist' laws, such as those for falling bodies, or the Gas Law, or Ohm's Law. Some are more like conceptual principles, giving a frame of reference, such as inertia, or conservation of energy, or the law of entropy.
	From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §9)
	A reaction: An interesting and important distinction, whenever one is exploring the links between theories of causation and of laws of nature. If one wished to attack the whole concept of 'laws of nature', this might be a good place to start.