21 ideas
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13) | |
| A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy. |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5) | |
| A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy. |
| 23438 | Full rationality must include morality [Foot] |
| Full Idea: You haven't got a full idea of rationality until you've got morality within it. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.35) | |
| A reaction: Does this mean that mathematical proofs are not rational, or that they are moral? |
| 23437 | Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot] |
| Full Idea: Practical rationality is goodness in respect of reason for actions, just as rationality of thinking is goodness in respect of beliefs. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.35) | |
| A reaction: It is very Greek to think that rationality involves goodness. There seems to be a purely instrumental form of practical reason that just gets from A to B, as when giving accurate street directions to someone. |
| 23436 | It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot] |
| Full Idea: One would need a very special, very Humean, view about reasons for actions to think a man doesn't have a reason unless he cares. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.34-5) | |
| A reaction: She says she used to believe this, but was wrong. It is hard to imagine acting for reasons if they don't care about anything at all (even that it's their job). But then people just do care about things. |
| 8239 | If the King likes music then there is hope for the state [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: If the King has a great fondness for music, then perhaps there is hope for the state of Ch'i. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.B.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be Shakespeare's attitude to music as well. The general idea must be that love of music requires a selfless state of mind, where the mind revels in the beauty of something outside of itself. Respect is the desirable result. |
| 23431 | Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot] |
| Full Idea: We describe defects in human beings in the same way as we do defects in plants and animals. …You cannot talk about a river as being defective. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33) | |
| A reaction: This is a much clearer commitment to naturalistic ethics than I have found in her more academic writings. My opinion of Foot (which was already high) went up when I read this interview. …She says vice is a defect of the will. |
| 23398 | Human nature is naturally compassionate and good (as a 'sprout'), but people may not be good [Mengzi (Mencius), by Norden] |
| Full Idea: Mengzi does not claim that humans are innately good; he claims that human nature is innately good. …He says that 'the heart of compassion' (manifested when anyone sees a child about to fall into a well) is the 'sprout of benevolence'. | |
| From: report of Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE]) by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.II | |
| A reaction: There is a nice distinction here between the 'sprout' of human nature and the finished product. Seeds have the potential to produce tall healthy plants, but circumstances can warp them. |
| 23433 | Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot] |
| Full Idea: A plant needs strong roots in the same way human beings need courage. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33) | |
| A reaction: I'm not quite convince by the analogy, but I strongly agree with her basic approach. |
| 23432 | Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot] |
| Full Idea: There are concepts which apply only to living things, considered in their own right, which would include function, welfare, flourishing, interests and the good of something. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33) | |
| A reaction: This is a very Aristotelian view, with which I entirely agree. The central concept is function. |
| 23434 | There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot] |
| Full Idea: If you say 'an owl should be able to see in the dark' …you're not going to think that there's a gap between facts and evaluation. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be a major and fundamental idea, which pinpoints the failure of Humeans to understand the world correctly. There is always total nihilism, of course, but that is a sort of blindness to how things are. Demanding 'proof' of values is crazy. |
| 23400 | Righteousness is extending the unthinkable, to reveal what must be done [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: People all have things they will not do. To extend this reaction to that which they will do is righteousness. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 7B31), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.IV | |
| A reaction: Very nice! Kekes points out the enormous importance of unthinkable deeds. Depravity is when the unthinkable gradually begins to look possible, which is probably a social phenomenon, a creeping cancer in a culture. |
| 23439 | Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot] |
| Full Idea: I don't believe in ultimate principles that must be simply affirmed or denied, but rather in an appeal to the necessities of human life. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.37) | |
| A reaction: I agree. Humans have a strong tendency to elevate anything which they consider important into an absolute (such as the value of life, or freedom). |
| 23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |
| Full Idea: You lose the sense of 'should' if you go on saying 'why should I?' when you've finished the argument about what is rational to do, what you've got reason to do. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], P.34) | |
| A reaction: Some people reify the concept of duty, so that they do what is required without caring about the reason. I suppose that would wither if they were shown that no reason exists. |
| 23399 | Each correct feeling relies on an underlying virtue [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: The heart of compassion is benevolence. The heart of disdain is righteousness. The heart of respect is propriety. The heart of approval and disapproval is wisdom. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 6A6), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.III | |
| A reaction: 'Disdain' seems to be the response to anyone who is disrespectful. Note that wisdom concerns judgements. Respect seems to be more of a social convention than an actual concern for others. |
| 8235 | Should a coward who ran fifty paces from a battle laugh at another who ran a hundred? [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: If two soldiers were fleeing from a battle, and one stopped after a hundred paces and the other stopped after a fifty paces, what would you think if the latter, as one who only ran fifty paces, were to laugh at the former who ran a hundred? | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice illustration, in my view, of the universality of truths about human virtue. In no culture would this laughter be appropriate. Nevertheless, there must be degrees of dishonour. Better to flee than join in with the likely winners. |
| 8240 | A true king shares his pleasure with the people [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: If you shared your enjoyment of music or of hunting with the people, you would be a true King. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.B.1) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that this is a great truth for dictators and traditional monarchs. One pictures the successful ones attending public entertainments, and allowing the public to see their own. Tyrants keep entertainment private. Nero is a counterexample! |
| 8237 | Extend the treatment of the old and young in your family to the rest of society [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families. Treat your own young in a manner befitting their tender age, and extend this to the young of other families. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.7) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me to articulate the ideal of communitarianism very nicely. Morality is not just about healthy adults in war and peace. It must include the children and the old. The values of the family are above the values of contracts and calculations. |
| 8241 | Only put someone to death if the whole population believes it is deserved [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: When close attendants say a man deserves death, do not listen; when all the councillors say so, do not listen; when everyone says so, have the case investigated. If he is guilty, put him to death; he was put to death by the whole country. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.B.7) | |
| A reaction: The jury system is a gesture in this direction. Compare Idea 95. In Mencius's time, no doubt, everyone believed that capital punishment was sometimes right. Nowadays, when many people (e.g. me) reject it, the procedure won't work. |
| 8238 | Seeking peace through war is like looking for fish up a tree [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: Your desire to extend your territory by war, in order to bring peace, is like looking for fish by climbing a tree. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.7) | |
| A reaction: Mencius had a flair for analogies. Just occasionally I suppose he might be wrong on this point, but I would think that experiments in the laboratory of history have shown that he is right in nearly all cases. |
| 8236 | Avoid the animals you are going to eat, as it is hard once you have got to know them [Mengzi (Mencius)] |
| Full Idea: Once a gentleman has seen animals alive, he cannot bear to see them die, and once having heard their cry, he cannot bear to eat their flesh. That is why the gentleman keeps his distance from the kitchen. | |
| From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 1.A.7) | |
| A reaction: If you applied this to a Gestapo officer and his victims, it would obviously be the epitome of wickedness. But it is complex. Compassion is expected when we encounter suffering, but we are not obliged to seek out suffering. Or are we? |