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All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Sentences' and 'Scientific Thought'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

16728	Logicians acknowledge too few things, while others acknowledge too many [Fitzralph]
	Full Idea: Those who have been well trained in logic err in recognising too few things, whereas others who are ignorant of logic ascribe to every statement a new entity, postulating more entities than God has ever established as real.
	From: Richard Fitzralph (Sentences [1328], II.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.3

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism

11842	If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad]
	Full Idea: We call a lightning flash or a motor accident an event, but refuse to apply this to the cliffs of Dover. ...But quantitative differences (of time) give no good grounds for calling one bit of history an event, and refusing the name to another bit.
	From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], p.54), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 2.3 n13
	A reaction: Wiggins calls this proposal a 'terrible absurdity', but it seems to me to demand attention. There is a case to be made for a 'process' to be the fundamental category of our ontology, with stable physical objects seen in that light.

14759	A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad]
	Full Idea: A thing is simply a long event, throughout the course of which there is either qualitative similarity or continuous qualitative change, together with a characteristic spatio-temporal unity.
	From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], 10 'Duration')
	A reaction: At least he is trying to give some sort of principle that links the stages of the event together.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block

8160	The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett]
	Full Idea: Not only the present but also the past exist, but the future (so long as it is the future) does not.
	From: report of C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923]) by Michael Dummett - Thought and Reality 1
	A reaction: This is quite appealing, and seems right if you believe that every truth has a truthmaker, and that there are no truths about the future. And yet the whole misery of people dying is that they cease to exist.

14609	We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad]
	Full Idea: One theory accepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at all. Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except that fresh slices of existence have been added to the total history of the world.
	From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
	A reaction: This is now known as Broad's 'Growing Block' view of time. It is tempting to say that neither past nor future exist, but it seems undeniable that statements about the past can be wholly true, unlike those about the future.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series

22933	We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad]
	Full Idea: We imagine presentness moving, like the spot of light from a policeman's bulls eye traversing the fronts of houses in a street. What is illuminated is present, what was illuminated is past, and what is not yet illuminated is the future.
	From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
	A reaction: This is the 'moving spotlight' compromise theory, which retains the B-series eternal sequence of ordered events, but adds the A-series privileged present moment. Le Poidevin says Broad represents time twice over.