7491
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The phases of human thought are theological, then metaphysical, then positivist [Comte, by Watson]
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Full Idea:
The first phase of humanity was theological, attributing phenomena to a deity, the second metaphysical stage attributed them to abstract forms, the third positive stage abandons ultimate causes and just searches for regularities.
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From:
report of Auguste Comte (Course of Positive Philosophy [1846]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.32
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A reaction:
This is obviously a highly empirical programme, which reasserts Hume's view of the laws of nature. Effectively, positivism just is the rejection of metaphysics.
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18823
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To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
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Full Idea:
Stalnaker holds that there could have been people who do not actually exist, but he denies that there are things that could have been those people. That is, he denies the unrestricted validity of the Barcan Formula.
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From:
report of Robert C. Stalnaker (Counterparts and Identity [1987]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 6.2
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A reaction:
And quite right too, I should have thought. As they say, Jack Kennedy and Marilyn Monroe might have had a child, but the idea that we should accept some entity which might have been that child but wasn't sounds like nonsense. Except as fiction…..
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9390
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Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
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Full Idea:
Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
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From:
Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
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A reaction:
There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.
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9389
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Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
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Full Idea:
Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
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From:
Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
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A reaction:
I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.
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