7 ideas
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13) | |
A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy. |
22297 | Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Dummett aimed to characterise realism in terms not of the mind-independence of the entities but of the validity of bivalence for sentences referring to them. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (Realism [1982]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 21 'Lang' | |
A reaction: Hence he called himself a 'philosopher of language', rather than a 'philosopher of thought'. Philosophers of language are more likely to end up as anti-realists, I suspect. |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5) | |
A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy. |
13554 | True greatness is never allowing events to disturb you [Seneca] |
Full Idea: There is no more reliable proof of greatness than to be in a state where nothing can happen to make you disturbed. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §06) | |
A reaction: He specifically opposes Aristotle's view that there are times when anger is appropriate, and failure to be very angry indeed is a failure of character. |
13556 | Every night I critically review how I have behaved during the day [Seneca] |
Full Idea: When the lamp has been removed from my sight, and my wife, no stranger now to my habit, has fallen silent, I examine the whole of my day and retrace my actions and words; I hide nothing from myself. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §36) |
13552 | Anger is an extreme vice, threatening sanity, and gripping whole states [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Other vices drive the mind on, anger hurls it headlong; ..other vices revolt from good sense, this one from sanity; ...other vices seize individuals, this is the one passion that sometimes takes hold of an entire state. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §01) | |
A reaction: He particularly dislikes anger because it is the vice that leads to violence. |
13553 | Anger is a vice which afflicts good men as well as bad [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Other vile passions affect only the worst sort of men, but anger creeps up even on enlightened me who are otherwise sane. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §04) | |
A reaction: A very interesting observation for anyone who is trying to analyse the key issues in virtue theory. |