7 ideas
| 21750 | Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Science, thanks to its links with observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth. | |
| From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.63) | |
| A reaction: I would describe what he is affirming as a 'robust' theory of truth. An interesting aside, given his usual allegiance to disquotational, and even redundancy, accounts of truth. You can hardly rely on observations if you think they contain no truth. |
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13) | |
| A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy. |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5) | |
| A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy. |
| 21748 | More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Our inductions become increasingly explicit and deliberate, and in the fulness of time we even rise above induction, to the hypothetico-deductive method. | |
| From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.57) | |
| A reaction: This seems to defer to Hempel's account of scientific theorising. I wander what exactly 'rising above' means? |
| 7296 | 'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted] |
| Full Idea: 'Grue' is not a colour. | |
| From: Tom Milsted (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: This simple observation strikes me as rather crucial in assessing Goodman's paradox. Blue is a colour, but grue is some sort of behaviour. Blue is a secondary quality, but grue seems to be a primary quality. |
| 21749 | Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Altruistic values attach to satisfactions of other persons, without regard to ulterior satisfactions accruing to oneself. Ceremonial values attach to practices of one's society, without regard to satisfactions accruing to oneself. | |
| From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.58) | |
| A reaction: An interesting distinction, but probably as blurred and circular as (according to Quine) the analytic/synthetic distinction. |
| 21751 | Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself [Quine] |
| Full Idea: One cannot reasonably be called upon to love even one's neighbour quite as oneself. Is love to diminish inversely as the square of the distance? Is it to extend to other species than one's own? | |
| From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.65) | |
| A reaction: Quine isn't actually saying that love is inherently egoistic, but that is the implication. The power of my love is at its most powerful when it is closest to home. |