Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness'' and 'The Source of Necessity'

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12 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity

12432	Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale]
	Full Idea: The dilemma is that to give the ultimate source of any necessity, we must either appeal to something which could not have been otherwise (i.e. is itself necessary), or advert to something which could have been otherwise (i.e. is itself merely contingent).
	From: Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.301)
	A reaction: [Hale is summarising Blackburn's view, and going on to disagree with it] Hale looks for a third way, but Blackburn seems to face us with quite a plausible dilemma.

12434	Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
	Full Idea: We must distinguish between explaining particular necessities and explaining necessity in general; and we ought to distinguish between explaining, in regard to any necessary truth, why it is true, and explaining why it is necessary.
	From: Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.308)
	A reaction: Useful. The pluralist view I associate with Fine says we can explain types of necessity, but not necessity in general. If we seek truthmakers, there is a special case of what adds the necessity to the truth.

12435	The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale]
	Full Idea: My claim is that there are non-transitive explanations of necessities, where what explains is indeed necessary, but what explains the necessity of the explanandum is not the explanation's necessity, but its truth simpliciter.
	From: Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.311)
	A reaction: The big idea is to avoid a regress of necessities. The actual truths he proposes are essentialist. An interesting proposal. It might depend on how one views essences (as giving identity, or causal power)

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention

12433	If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
	Full Idea: If the alleged necessity, e,g, 2+2=4, really does depend upon a convention governing the use of the words in which we state it, and the existence of that convention is merely a contingent matter, then it can't after all be necessary.
	From: Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.302)
	A reaction: [Hale is citing Blackburn for this claim] Hale suggests replies, by keeping truth and meaning separate, and involving laws of logic. Blackburn clearly has a good point.

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts

12436	Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]
	Full Idea: It seems to me that identity-relations among concepts have more to do with explaining how we know that vixens are female foxes etc., than with explaining why it is necessary, and, more generally, with explaining why some necessities are knowable a priori.
	From: Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], P.313)
	A reaction: Hale rejects the conceptual and conventional accounts of necessity, in favour of the essentialist view. This strikes me as a good suggestion of Hale's, since I agree with him about the essentialism.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness

9312	Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: The two main competitors for reductive theories of consciousness are the representational theory (conscious if it represents in the right way), and higher-order monitoring (conscious if it is represented in the right way).
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], Intro)
	A reaction: Presumably there are also neuroscientists hunting for physical functions which might generate consciousness. The two mentioned here are rivals at one level of discourse. Both views may be simplistic, if complex teams of activities are involved.

9313	Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: On the assumption that any environmental feature can be represented either consciously or unconsciously, it is unclear how the mere representation of such a feature can render the representing state conscious.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
	A reaction: The authors are rejecting simple representation as the key, in favour of a distinctive sort of self-representation. I'm inclined to think that consciousness results from multiple co-ordinated layers of representation etc., which has no simple account.

9315	Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: The self-representational theory of consciousness says that when one has a conscious experience as of a red tomato, one is in an internal state that represents both a red tomato and itself.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
	A reaction: This seems to be avoiding the concept of 'higher-order', and yet that seems the only way to describe it - thought steps outside of itself, generating a level of meta-thought. I think that's the way to go. Philosophy is about-fifth level.

9316	How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: The difficulties with a self-representational view of consciousness are how self-representation of mental states could be possible, whether it leads to an infinite regress, and whether it can capture the actual phenomenology of experience.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §3)
	A reaction: [compressed] All of these objections strike me as persuasive, especially the first one. I'm not sure I know what self-representation is. Mirrors externally represent, and they can't represent themselves. Two mirrors together achieve something..

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought

9314	Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: A problem for explaining consciousness by higher-order representations is that, like their first-order counterparts, they can misrepresent; there could be a subjective impression of being in a conscious state without actually being in any conscious state.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
	A reaction: It sounds plausible that this is a logical possibility, but how do you assess whether it is an actual or natural possibility? Are we saying that higher-order representations are judgments, which could be true or false? Hm.