Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Does Consciousness Exist?' and 'Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects''

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis

9184	We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson]
	Full Idea: We have no prior reason to suppose that philosophically significant concepts have interesting analyses into necessary and sufficient conditions.
	From: Timothy Williamson (Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects' [1988])
	A reaction: We might think that they are either analysable or primitive, and that failure of analysis invites us to take a concept as primitive. But maybe God can analyse it and we can't.

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism

9183	Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson]
	Full Idea: The Fregean argument for platonism is that some true assertions contain singular terms which denote abstract objects if they denote anything; since the assertions are true, the singular terms denote.
	From: Timothy Williamson (Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects' [1988])
	A reaction: I am perplexed that anyone would rest their view of reality on such an argument. The obvious comparison would be with true remarks about blatantly fictional characters, or blatantly invented concepts such as 'checkmate'.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness

9286	Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
	Full Idea: Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and not a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, is best explained by their relations to one another, the relations being experiences.
	From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], §3)
	A reaction: This view has suddenly caught people's interest. It might be better than the higher/lower relationship, which seems to leave the basic problem untouched. Does a whole network of relations between experiences gradually 'add up' to consciousness?

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism

9285	'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James]
	Full Idea: 'Consciousness' is the name of a nonentity. ..Those who cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy. ..I deny that it stands for an entity, but it does stand for a function.
	From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], Intro)
	A reaction: This kind of view is often treated as being preposterous, but I think it is correct. No one is denying the phenomenology, but it is the ontology which is at stake. Either you are a substance dualist, or mind must be eliminated as an 'entity'.