Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts', 'Summula philosophiae naturalis' and 'Letters to William Molyneux'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

9390	Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
	A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.

7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism

16608	Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: Ockham is the scholastic paradigm of anti-realism with respect to the categories.
	From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 05.3
	A reaction: These are the ten categories mentioned in Aristotle's book 'Categories'.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9389	Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
	Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
	From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
	A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object

16599	Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: Ockham regards Quantity as an entirely superfluous ontological category, …because matter is intrinsically extended.
	From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.4

16681	Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham]
	Full Idea: Matter is made to have a greater or lesser quantity not through its receiving any absolute accident, but through condensation and rarefaction alone. Parts come more or less close together, which can happen with local motion.
	From: William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320], I.13), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.1
	A reaction: This is Ockham at his most modern, rejecting the odd idea of Quantity in favour of a modern corpuscular view of the mere motions of matter.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence

12812	Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke]
	Full Idea: This I do say, that there are real constitutions in things from whence simple ideas flow, which we observe combin'd in them. But we distinguish particular substances into sorts or genera not by real essences or constitutions, but by observed simple ideas.
	From: John Locke (Letters to William Molyneux [1692], 1693.01.20)
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement I can find of Locke's position on essences. He is totally committed to their reality, but strongly aware of the empirical constraints which keep us from direct knowledge of them. He would be amazed by modern discoveries.