40 ideas
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
Full Idea: By dissection I can make the concept distinct only by making the marks it contains clear. That is what analysis does. If this analysis is complete ...and in addition there are not so many marks, then it is precise and so constitutes a definition. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.455), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc' | |
A reaction: I think Aristotle would approve of this. We need to grasp that a philosophical definition is quite different from a lexicographical definition. 'Completeness' may involve quite a lot. |
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
Full Idea: My knowing that I had a hidden birth-mark would not entitle me to infer with any great degree of confidence that the same was true of everybody else. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.E) | |
A reaction: This is the notorious 'induction from a single case' which was used by Mill to prove that other minds exist. It is a very nice illustration of the weakness of arguments from analogy. Probably analogy on its own is useless, but is a key part of induction. |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
Full Idea: In logic the question is not one of contingent but of necessary rules, not how to think, but how we ought to think. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.16), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Trans' | |
A reaction: Presumably it aspires to the objectivity of a single correct account of how we all ought to think. I'm sympathetic to that, rather than modern cultural relativism about reason. Logic is rooted in nature, not in arbitrary convention. |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
Full Idea: It is currently held that we are committed to a belief in the existence of anything over which we quantify. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], IX.C) | |
A reaction: In a fairy tale we quantify over fairies, so some further criterion will obviously be needed. |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
Full Idea: We can significantly ask what properties it is necessary for something to possess in order to be a thing of such and such a kind, since that asks what properties enter into the definition of the kind. But there is no such definition of the individual. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], 9.A.5) | |
A reaction: [Quoted, not surprisingly, by Wiggins] Illuminating. If essence is just about necessary properties, I begin to see why the sortal might be favoured. I take it to concern explanatory mechanisms, and hence the individual. |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
Full Idea: If we only know what we know ...we would be astonished by the treasures contained in our knowledge. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.843), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc' | |
A reaction: Nice remark. He doesn't require immediat recall of knowledge. You can't be required to know that you know something. That doesn't imply externalism, though. I believe in securely founded internal knowledge which is hard to recall. |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The theory that other people besides oneself have mental states is one that has no serious rival. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.E) | |
A reaction: See 3463, where Searle says there is no such thing as our "theory" about other minds. In a science fiction situation (see 'Blade Runner'), this unrivalled theory could quickly unravel. It could even be a fact that you are the only humanoid with a mind. |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
Full Idea: In 1936 I combined a mentalistic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to oneself with a behaviouristic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to others. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.D) | |
A reaction: He then criticises his view for inconsistency. Ryle preferred a behaviouristic account of introspection, but Ayer calls this 'ridiculous'. Ayer hunts for a compromise, but then settles for the right answer, which makes mentalism the 'best explanation'. |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The acceptance of physicalism undercuts the other minds problem by equating experiences with events in the brain, which are publicly observable. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.E) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that if we could actually observe the operations of one another's brains, a great many of the problems of philosophy would never have appeared in the first place. Imagine a transparent skull and brain, with coloured waves moving through it. |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Is the character of being an item of experience one that can accrue to a quale through its relation to other qualia, or must it consist in a relation to a subject, which is conscious of these elements and distinct from them? | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B) | |
A reaction: When nicely put like this, it is hard to see how qualia could be experiences just because they relate to one another. It begs the question of what is causing the relationship. There seems to be a Cogito-like assumption of a thinker. |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The ground for thinking that qualia are only experiences because they relate to a unifying subject is that they have to be identified, by being brought under concepts, and giving rise to judgements which usually go beyond them. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B) | |
A reaction: Thus one of Hume's greatest fans gives the clearest objection to Hume. It strikes me as a very powerful objection, better than anything Carruthers offers (1394,1395,1396). The conceptual element is very hard to disentangle from the qualia. |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
Full Idea: In general the two criteria of memory and bodily identity work together. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B) | |
A reaction: This seems better than any simplistic one-criterion approach. In life we use different criteria for our own identity, as when dreaming, or waking with a hangover, or wondering if we are dead after an accident. |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Self-consciousness is not a primitive datum, or in other words the observer's experiences are not intrinsically marked as his own. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.A) | |
A reaction: This is a very Humean, ruthlessly empiricist view of the matter. Plenty of philosophers (existentialists, or Charles Taylor) would say that our experiences have our interests or values built into them. Why are they experiences, and not just events? |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
Full Idea: If there were temporal gaps in the consciousness of disembodied spirits, the occurrences of memory-experiences would not be sufficient to bridge them. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.C) | |
A reaction: Ayer is very sympathetic to the idea that the body is a key ingredient in personal identity. Without a body, there would be no criteria at all for the continuity of a spirit which lost consciousness for a while, since consciousness is all it is. |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
Full Idea: If mind and brain exactly correspond we have as good ground for saying the brain depends on the mind as the other way round; if predominance is given to the brain, the reason is that it fits into a wider explanatory system. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.D) | |
A reaction: A small but significant point. If an 'identity' theory is to be developed, then this step in the argument has to be justified. It is tempting here to move to the eliminativist view, because we no longer have to worry about a 'direction of priority'. |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Our talk of propositions should not be regarded as anything more than a concise way of talking about equivalent sentences. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], IX.C) | |
A reaction: Wrong, though I can see why he says it. We struggle to express difficult propositions by offering several similar (but not equivalent) sentences. What is the criterion for deciding his 'equivalence'? |
20547 | We should respect the right of people to live in their own way, even if it is irrational [Swift] |
Full Idea: Forcing people to do what is rational involves a lack of respect, a failure to respect the value of her living her life in her own (irrational) way. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 2 'Resisting' 6) | |
A reaction: Up to a point. Irrationally eccentric is one thing, and irrationally self-destructive is another. You can sit back and watch your children embrace a life less happy than the one you wanted for them - but not a life of utter misery. |
20564 | Anti-colonial movements usually invoke the right of their 'people' to self-determination [Swift] |
Full Idea: Nationalist movements seeking to throw off the yoke of colonial rule are often motivated by a sense that their 'people' have the right to self-determination. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Intrinsic 1') | |
A reaction: In 2017, Basques, Catalans and Kurds come to mind. The whole of Africa was an example of this c.1950-80, but there was uncertainty about states, tribes and language groups. |
20535 | Isn't it more rational to maximise the average position, but with a safety net? [Swift] |
Full Idea: Wouldn't it be more rational to choose principles that would maximize the average position, perhaps subject to some 'floor' level beneath which they would not want to take the risk of sinking? | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Rawls') | |
A reaction: The criticism is that Rawls's prediction is over-cautious, and that people will take mild risks in what they choose, as long as there is no danger of disaster. (Just as you should allow small children to risk injury, but not death). |
20537 | Hypothetical contracts have no binding force [Swift] |
Full Idea: A common objection to Rawls is that hypothetical contracts, unlike real ones, have no binding force. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Rawls') | |
A reaction: [I think Dworkin made this point] 'Contract' may be metaphorical. Perhaps it is just an 'initial agreement' or a 'working arrangement', |
20542 | Cosmopolitans reject the right of different states to distribute resources in different ways [Swift] |
Full Idea: Cosmopolitans who claim that the same distributive principles should apply to all human beings seem to be denying that different states may make different judgements about how they want to allocate resources among their members. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Social') | |
A reaction: If you want to be a citizen of the world, you have to face up to the pluralistic character of cultures. Do you thereby want to be a citizen of both California and Saudi Arabia? Or are you actually just becoming a citizen of nowhere? |
20559 | Democracy is bad, but the other systems are worse [Swift] |
Full Idea: During WW2 Winston Churchill famously said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others that have been tried. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Procedures') | |
A reaction: [Actually a speech in 1947, which began 'it has been said that....'] Aristotle thought an intelligent and benevolent dictatorship was the best form, but held little hope of achieving it. Getting rid of bad rulers is the big virtue. |
20561 | Since all opinions are treated as equal in democracy, it implies there are no right answers [Swift] |
Full Idea: If there were moral knowledge about political matters, democracy would be a very strange way of reaching it. Democratic law-making means treating each person's view as equally good, which only makes sense if there is nothing to be right or wrong about. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Subjectivism') | |
A reaction: Ah, I suddenly grasp that the modern fad for a rather gormless blanket relativism is rooted in the modern desire to take democracy really seriously. Important to remember Condorcet's point here. |
20562 | Design your democracy to treat citizens equally, or to produce better citizens? [Swift] |
Full Idea: If your main reason for being a democrat is that democratic procedures respect citizens equally, then you may want a different kind of democracy from those who favour it because they think it tends to produce better citizens? | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Values') | |
A reaction: [Combine this with Idea 20563] |
20563 | Design your democracy to yield political stability, or good decisions? [Swift] |
Full Idea: If you value democracy because it yields political stability, then you will probably worry about different aspects of the procedure from those who care about its producing good decisions. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Values') | |
A reaction: [Combine this with Idea 20562] Surely the primary aim must be good decisions? The other three options are the result of pessimism about any method achieving that. Instability, inequality and dud citizens are bars to good decisions. |
20560 | Teledemocracy omits debate and deliberation, which are important parts of good decisions [Swift] |
Full Idea: We are averse to teledemocracy because it misses out some important parts of a good decision-making procedure, such as debate and deliberation. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Procedures') | |
A reaction: Perhaps you should be sent a short info pack, and only allowed to vote when you have passed a factual multiple choice test about the topic. Or one pack from each political party. Maybe compulsory online discussion as well. |
20554 | Multiculturalism is a barrier to the whole state being a community [Swift] |
Full Idea: For those wanting to regard the state itself as a community, multiculturalism can be a problem. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Liberalism') | |
A reaction: A very important idea. A certain type of aggressive patriot passionately wants the whole country to be a close-bound community, and becomes deeply frustrated by the impossibility of this in a complex and fluid modern world. |
20553 | Liberals mistakenly think individuals choose their values, without reference to the community [Swift] |
Full Idea: The two core liberal mistakes (according to communitarians) are that people choose their values, and that they do so in some way detached from their communities. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Correcting') | |
A reaction: I think I might be a communitarian liberal, meaning that extreme individualism is both incorrect and pernicious, but that communities should only exist to promote the varied lives of individuals within them. |
20556 | The best way to build a cohesive community is to be involved in a war [Swift] |
Full Idea: There is nothing like a war to build a sense of common purpose, of being in the same boat, and to generate the kind of interaction between people that breaks down divisive social boundaries. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014]) | |
A reaction: A nice warning to those who over-do or simplify communitarianism. Alternatively, the greatest sign of health in a community is that citizens have almost no interest in one another? |
20557 | Membership and inclusion in a community implies non-membership and exclusion [Swift] |
Full Idea: Community is about membership and inclusion. But that means it is also about non-membership and exclusion. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Conc') | |
A reaction: I'm a fan of communitarianism (focused on Aristotle's life of individual virtue for each citizen), but I'm beginning to see that it has a poisonous cousin travelling under the same name. The cousin's rallying cries focus on aliens and enemies. |
20555 | Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community [Swift] |
Full Idea: Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community - from practices that stifle the individual's freedom to choose for herself how she lives her life. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Liberalism') | |
A reaction: The phrase 'too much community' is an excellent warning to communitarians. I'm happy to be enmeshed in a community, as long as it is composed of highly liberal and easy-going individuals. Avoid too much bad community. |
20540 | Redistributing wealth treats some people as means, rather than as ends [Swift] |
Full Idea: Treating people as means seems like a fairly accurate description of what is involved when the state coercively redistributes resources from some to others. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Nozick') | |
A reaction: The objection comes from Nozick, and alludes to Kant's desire to treat everyone as an end in themselves. Personally I don't mind at all being treated as a means, when my wife asks me to make her a cup of tea. Or paying my taxes to help the community. |
20551 | Men have had the power to structure all of our social institutions [Swift] |
Full Idea: The problem for feminists is that men have had the power to structure all our social institutions - family, economy, polity - in ways that suit them. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Gender') | |
A reaction: An interesting question is whether masculine domination runs even deeper than that, into our value system, our metaphysics, our science, our epistemology, our language. How do you tell? If women take over half the masculine roles, does that solve it? |
20545 | Maybe a freedom is from a restraint, and also in order to do something [Swift] |
Full Idea: Maybe freedom is a triadic relation, involving an agent, freedom from a contraint, and in order to act towards some goal. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 2 'Two') | |
A reaction: [He cites Gerald MacCallum for this thought] The point is that this makes freedom both negative and positive, contrary to Isaiah Berlin's claim. But on the first day of the school holidays you are 'free', with nothing in particular in mind. |
20550 | Opportunity should ignore extraneous factors, or foster competence, or ignore all disadvantages [Swift] |
Full Idea: The minimal conception of equality of opportunity is that race or gender or religion should not affect chances of a good job or education. The conventional conception needs equality in acquiring competences. Radical views ignore inborn disadvantages. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Equality') | |
A reaction: [my summary of Swift] The strong version only says the less talented should have access to large rewards. The whole idea has strong capitalist assumptions. |
20536 | Inequalities are needed, as incentives to do the most important jobs [Swift] |
Full Idea: Without inequalities, people will have no incentive to do one job rather than another - to do the kind of work which is most useful. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Rawls') | |
A reaction: The reality is that the lowest pay goes to the jobs that no one wants to do, and all the really nice jobs are usually well paid. Which is a conspiracy, because all the salaries are set by the people with the nice jobs. |
20548 | A person can desire redistibution of wealth, without it being for reasons of equality [Swift] |
Full Idea: Someone who rejects equality can care passionately that resources should be transferred from the rich to the poor. They are just rejecting a particular reason that might be offered to justify the redistribution. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Intro') | |
A reaction: For example, it might be for utilitarian reasons, which usually only seek maximised happiness, not equal happiness. And one may love many forms of equality, without economic equality being one of them. |
20541 | You can't necessarily sell your legitimate right to something, even if you produced it [Swift] |
Full Idea: Ownership is a complicated idea. I have a right to the office photocopier, but I can's sell the right to others. If people have absolute rights over what they produce, why can't parents sell their children into slavery? | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Nozick') | |
A reaction: If I make a car from stolen parts, does constructing it make it mine? Etc. Do birds own their nests? Swift goes on to ask if we 'own' our bodies. |
20546 | Libertarians about property ignore the fact that private property is a denial of freedoms [Swift] |
Full Idea: Libertarians say that they care about freedom, and argue for private property rights on freedom grounds. But they don't sem to care about, or even notice, the unfreedom implied by the existence of private property rights. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 2 'Freedom') | |
A reaction: When I pass some vast country estate totally surrounded by a high wall, I certainly don't think how wonderful it is that someone has the right to own this property as private land. On the contrary.... |
20533 | Justice can be seen as fairness or entitlement or desert [Swift] |
Full Idea: The three influential conceptions of justice are as fairness (Rawls), as entitlement (Nozick), and as desert. | |
From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Concept') |