Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wiener Logik', 'The Conquest of Happiness' and 'Non-foundationalist epistemology'

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11 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin]
     Full Idea: How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? How can their relation to other less than tenable enhance their tenability?
     From: Catherine Z. Elgin (Non-foundationalist epistemology [2005], p.157)
     A reaction: Her example is witnesses to a crime. Bayes Theorem appears to deal with individual items. "The thief had green hair" becomes more likely with multiple testimony. This is a very persuasive first step towards justification as coherence.
Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin]
     Full Idea: The best explanation of coherence (where the components of a coherent account must be mutually consistent, cotenable and supportive) is that the account is at least roughly true.
     From: Catherine Z. Elgin (Non-foundationalist epistemology [2005], p.158)
     A reaction: Note that she is NOT employing a coherence account of truth (which I take to be utterly wrong). It is notoriously difficult to define coherence. If the components must be 'tenable', they have epistemic status apart from their role in coherence.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant]
     Full Idea: By dissection I can make the concept distinct only by making the marks it contains clear. That is what analysis does. If this analysis is complete ...and in addition there are not so many marks, then it is precise and so constitutes a definition.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.455), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
     A reaction: I think Aristotle would approve of this. We need to grasp that a philosophical definition is quite different from a lexicographical definition. 'Completeness' may involve quite a lot.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant]
     Full Idea: In logic the question is not one of contingent but of necessary rules, not how to think, but how we ought to think.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.16), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Trans'
     A reaction: Presumably it aspires to the objectivity of a single correct account of how we all ought to think. I'm sympathetic to that, rather than modern cultural relativism about reason. Logic is rooted in nature, not in arbitrary convention.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant]
     Full Idea: If we only know what we know ...we would be astonished by the treasures contained in our knowledge.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.843), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
     A reaction: Nice remark. He doesn't require immediat recall of knowledge. You can't be required to know that you know something. That doesn't imply externalism, though. I believe in securely founded internal knowledge which is hard to recall.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin]
     Full Idea: The best explanation of the coherence of 'Middlemarch' lies in the novelist's craft. Coherence conduces to epistemic acceptability only when the best explanation of the coherence of a constellation of claims is that they are (at least roughly) true.
     From: Catherine Z. Elgin (Non-foundationalist epistemology [2005], p.160)
     A reaction: Yes. This combines my favourite inference to the best explanation (the favourite tool of us realists) with coherence as justification, where coherence can, crucially, have a social dimension. I begin to think this is the correct account of justification.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell]
     Full Idea: A happy life must to a great extent be a quiet life, for it is only in an atmosphere of quiet that true joy can live.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
     A reaction: Most people's image of happiness is absorption in an interesting task, or relaxing in good company. The idea that happiness is wild excitement exists, but is a minority view.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell]
     Full Idea: It is one of the essentials of boredom that one's faculties must not be fully occupied.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
     A reaction: He gives running for your life as an example of non-boredom. I suspect that this is only the sort of boredom that troubled Russell, and not the sort of profound boredom that led the actor George Sanders to suicide (according to his last note).
Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell]
     Full Idea: A certain power of enduring boredom is essential to a happy life, and is one of the things that ought to be taught to the young.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
     A reaction: As an example he suggests that Wordsworth would never have written 'The Prelude' is he had never been bored when young. Which suggests that Russell doesn't really get boredom, seeing it merely as a stimulus to work.
Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell]
     Full Idea: Boredom has been, I believe, one of the great motive powers throughout the historical epoch, and is so at the present day more than ever.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
     A reaction: Most of his essay tells us how to avoid boredom, rather than how it motivates.
Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell]
     Full Idea: We are less bored than our ancestors were, but we are more afraid of boredom
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4)
     A reaction: I get the impression that the invention of the powerful mobile phone has largely banished boredom from human life, except when you are obliged to switch it off. The fear of boredom may hence be even greater now.