18 ideas
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
Full Idea: By dissection I can make the concept distinct only by making the marks it contains clear. That is what analysis does. If this analysis is complete ...and in addition there are not so many marks, then it is precise and so constitutes a definition. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.455), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc' | |
A reaction: I think Aristotle would approve of this. We need to grasp that a philosophical definition is quite different from a lexicographical definition. 'Completeness' may involve quite a lot. |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
Full Idea: In logic the question is not one of contingent but of necessary rules, not how to think, but how we ought to think. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.16), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Trans' | |
A reaction: Presumably it aspires to the objectivity of a single correct account of how we all ought to think. I'm sympathetic to that, rather than modern cultural relativism about reason. Logic is rooted in nature, not in arbitrary convention. |
3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
Full Idea: Shadows are distinct from the physical objects casting the shadows and irreducible to them; any attempt at reduction would be incoherent, as it would entail identifying a shadow with the object of which it is a shadow. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 6.3) | |
A reaction: Another failure to find a decent analogy for what is claimed in property dualism. A 'shadow' is a reification of the abstract concept of an absence of light. Objects lose their shadows at dusk, but the object itself doesn't change. |
3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
Full Idea: The word 'ontology' is derived from the Greek word 'ontia', which means 'things which exist'. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.1) |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
Full Idea: If we only know what we know ...we would be astonished by the treasures contained in our knowledge. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.843), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc' | |
A reaction: Nice remark. He doesn't require immediat recall of knowledge. You can't be required to know that you know something. That doesn't imply externalism, though. I believe in securely founded internal knowledge which is hard to recall. |
3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
Full Idea: The argument from analogy makes it impossible to check my inductive inferences because of the privacy of other minds; it also seems irresponsible to generalise from a single case; and it seems like a case of human chauvinism. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Privacy of other minds need not imply scepticism about them. I'm a believer, so I have no trouble checking my theories. Solipsists can't 'check' anything. It isn't 'irresponsible' to generalise from one case if that is all you have. |
3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
Full Idea: If I am my brain this leads to the odd result that you have never met me because you have never seen my brain. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 10.7) | |
A reaction: 'Star Trek' is full of aliens who appear beautiful, and turn out to be ugly grey lumps. 'I am my face' would be just as odd, particularly if I were in a coma, or dead. |
3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
Full Idea: I may be the final authority on whether my shoe pinches, but I am manifestly not the final authority on whether I understand some mathematical theorem. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.7) | |
A reaction: However, it doesn't follow that his teachers are the final authority either, because he may get correct answers by an algorithm, and bluff his way when demonstrating his understanding. Who knows whether anyone really understands anything? |
3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
Full Idea: If mental events are causally efficacious only by virtue of their physical features and not their mental ones, …then anomalous monism leads straight to ephiphenomenalism. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.6) | |
A reaction: As epiphenomenalism strikes me as being incoherent (see Idea 7379), what this amounts to is that either mental effects are causally efficacious, or they are not worth mentioning. I take them to be causally efficacious because they are brain events. |
3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
Full Idea: In token-identity mental and physical features seem as unrelated as colour and shape, which is very weak physicalism because it does not allow physical states an explanatory role in accounting for mental states. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 3.8.6) | |
A reaction: Colour and shape are not totally unrelated, as they can both be totally explained by a full knowledge of the physical substance involved. ...But maybe if we fully understood Spinoza's single substance...? See Idea 4834. |
20180 | A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell] |
Full Idea: A happy life must to a great extent be a quiet life, for it is only in an atmosphere of quiet that true joy can live. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: Most people's image of happiness is absorption in an interesting task, or relaxing in good company. The idea that happiness is wild excitement exists, but is a minority view. |
20177 | Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is one of the essentials of boredom that one's faculties must not be fully occupied. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: He gives running for your life as an example of non-boredom. I suspect that this is only the sort of boredom that troubled Russell, and not the sort of profound boredom that led the actor George Sanders to suicide (according to his last note). |
20178 | Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell] |
Full Idea: We are less bored than our ancestors were, but we are more afraid of boredom | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: I get the impression that the invention of the powerful mobile phone has largely banished boredom from human life, except when you are obliged to switch it off. The fear of boredom may hence be even greater now. |
20176 | Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell] |
Full Idea: Boredom has been, I believe, one of the great motive powers throughout the historical epoch, and is so at the present day more than ever. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: Most of his essay tells us how to avoid boredom, rather than how it motivates. |
20179 | Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell] |
Full Idea: A certain power of enduring boredom is essential to a happy life, and is one of the things that ought to be taught to the young. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: As an example he suggests that Wordsworth would never have written 'The Prelude' is he had never been bored when young. Which suggests that Russell doesn't really get boredom, seeing it merely as a stimulus to work. |
3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
Full Idea: The principle of nomological causality says that if two events are intrinsically causally related, there must be a strict physical law under which they can be subsumed. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5) |
3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
Full Idea: 'Deductive-nomological' explanation consists of two premises - a strict law with no exceptions and supporting deterministic counterfactuals, and a statement of an event which falls under the law - which together logically require the effect. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.4) |
3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |
Full Idea: 'Strict' laws of nature contain no ceteris paribus clauses ('all things being equal'), and are part of a closed system (so that whatever affects the system must be included within the system). | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5) |