Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue', 'A Structural Account of Mathematics' and 'Elements of Law and Justice'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


47 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant]
     Full Idea: Moral self-knowledge, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of one's heart that are quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 441 I.I)
     A reaction: I'm not clear what I am supposed to be looking for on this quest. I'm guessing that being completely honest about one's own maxims in moral action would be a good start. And maybe confronting one's murkier desires.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant]
     Full Idea: A philosophy of any subject (a system of rational knowledge from concepts) requires a system of pure rational concepts independent of any conditions of intuition, that is, a metaphysics.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 375 Pref)
     A reaction: 'Pure rational concepts' must be a priori, and (in Kant's case) transcendental - i.e. discovered from the study of presuppositions. Does this actually say that the philosophies of science, biology, psychology, economics etc each needs a metaphysics?
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant]
     Full Idea: It is a highly unphilosophic expedient to resort to a number of proofs for one and the same proposition, consoling oneself that the multitude of reasons makes up for the inadequacy of any one of them taken by itself.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 403 Intro XIII)
     A reaction: This makes philosophical proofs sound very mathematical in character, whereas I think most reasons for a proposition given in philosophy are more like evidence, which can clearly accumulate in a rational way. Some maths proofs are better than others.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Realists about sets say there exists a null set in the real world, with no members [Chihara]
     Full Idea: In the Gödelian realistic view of set theory the statement that there is a null set as the assertion of the existence in the real world of a set that has no members.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 11.6)
     A reaction: It seems to me obvious that such a claim is nonsense on stilts. 'In the beginning there was the null set'?
We only know relational facts about the empty set, but nothing intrinsic [Chihara]
     Full Idea: Everything we know about the empty set is relational; we know that nothing is the membership relation to it. But what do we know about its 'intrinsic properties'?
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.5)
     A reaction: Set theory seems to depend on the concept of the empty set. Modern theorists seem over-influenced by the Quine-Putnam view, that if science needs it, we must commit ourselves to its existence.
In simple type theory there is a hierarchy of null sets [Chihara]
     Full Idea: In simple type theory, there is a null set of type 1, a null set of type 2, a null set of type 3..... (Quine has expressed his distaste for this).
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 07.4)
     A reaction: It is bad enough trying to individuate the unique null set, without whole gangs of them drifting indistinguishably through the logical fog. All rational beings should share Quine's distaste, even if Quine is wrong.
The null set is a structural position which has no other position in membership relation [Chihara]
     Full Idea: In the structuralist view of sets, in structures of a certain sort the null set is taken to be a position (or point) that will be such that no other position (or point) will be in the membership relation to it.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 11.6)
     A reaction: It would be hard to conceive of something having a place in a structure if nothing had a relation to it, so is the null set related to singeton sets but not there members. It will be hard to avoid Platonism here. Set theory needs the null set.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What is special about Bill Clinton's unit set, in comparison with all the others? [Chihara]
     Full Idea: What is it about the intrinsic properties of just that one unit set in virtue of which Bill Clinton is related to just it and not to any other unit sets in the set-theoretical universe?
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.5)
     A reaction: If we all kept pet woodlice, we had better not hold a wood louse rally, or we might go home with the wrong one. My singleton seems seems remarkably like yours. Could we, perhaps, swap, just for a change?
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
The set theorist cannot tell us what 'membership' is [Chihara]
     Full Idea: The set theorist cannot tell us anything about the true relationship of membership.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.5)
     A reaction: If three unrelated objects suddenly became members of a set, it is hard to see how the world would have changed, except in the minds of those thinking about it.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
ZFU refers to the physical world, when it talks of 'urelements' [Chihara]
     Full Idea: ZFU set theory talks about physical objects (the urelements), and hence is in some way about the physical world.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 11.5)
     A reaction: This sounds a bit surprising, given that the whole theory would appear to be quite unaffected if God announced that idealism is true and there are no physical objects.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara]
     Full Idea: A pack of wolves is not thought to go out of existence just because some member of the pack is killed.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 07.5)
     A reaction: The point is that the formal extensional notion of a set doesn't correspond to our common sense notion of a group or class. Even a highly scientific theory about wolves needs a loose notion of a wolf pack.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
The mathematics of relations is entirely covered by ordered pairs [Chihara]
     Full Idea: Everything one needs to do with relations in mathematics can be done by taking a relation to be a set of ordered pairs. (Ordered triples etc. can be defined as order pairs, so that <x,y,z> is <x,<y,z>>).
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 07.2)
     A reaction: How do we distinguish 'I own my cat' from 'I love my cat'? Or 'I quite like my cat' from 'I adore my cat'? Nevertheless, this is an interesting starting point for a discussion of relations.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara]
     Full Idea: In first-order logic a set of sentences is 'consistent' iff there is an interpretation (or structure) in which the set of sentences is true. ..For Frege, though, a set of sentences is consistent if it is not possible to deduce a contradiction from it.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 02.1)
     A reaction: The first approach seems positive, the second negative. Frege seems to have a higher standard, which is appealing, but the first one seems intuitively right. There is a possible world where this could work.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara]
     Full Idea: With the invention of analytic geometry (by Fermat and then Descartes) physical space could be represented as having a mathematical structure, which could eventually lead to its axiomatization (by Hilbert).
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 02.3)
     A reaction: The idea that space might have axioms seems to be pythagoreanism run riot. I wonder if there is some flaw at the heart of Einstein's General Theory because of this?
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride]
     Full Idea: Chihara's 'constructability theory' is nominalist - mathematics is reducible to a simple theory of types. Instead of talk of sets {x:x is F}, we talk of open sentences Fx defining them. Existence claims become constructability of sentence tokens.
     From: report of Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004]) by Fraser MacBride - Review of Chihara's 'Structural Acc of Maths' p.81
     A reaction: This seems to be approaching the problem in a Fregean way, by giving an account of the semantics. Chihara is trying to evade the Quinean idea that assertion is ontological commitment. But has Chihara retreated too far? How does he assert existence?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara]
     Full Idea: If mathematics shares whatever confirmation accrues to the theories using it, would it not be reasonable to suppose that mathematics shares whatever disconfirmation accrues to the theories using it?
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 05.8)
     A reaction: Presumably Quine would bite the bullet here, although maths is much closer to the centre of his web of belief, and so far less likely to require adjustment. In practice, though, mathematics is not challenged whenever an experiment fails.
No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara]
     Full Idea: Evidently, no scientific explanations of specific phenomena would collapse as a result of any hypothetical discovery that no mathematical objects exist.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 09.1)
     A reaction: It is inconceivable that anyone would challenge this claim. A good model seems to be drama; a play needs commitment from actors and audience, even when we know it is fiction. The point is that mathematics doesn't collapse either.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
     Full Idea: That the concept of a thing is possible (not self-contradictory) is not yet sufficient for assuming the possibility of the thing itself (the objective reality of the concept).
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 382 Intro I)
     A reaction: I take this to be an inkling of Kripke's a posteriori scientific necessities, which place far greater restrictions on the possibilies of what we seem to have conceived, in addition to the mere need for consistency.
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Hypotheses come from induction, which is comparison of experiences [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We construct a hypothesis on the basis of an induction, that is on the basis of a comparison of experiences.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Elements of Law and Justice [1669], p.2)
     A reaction: This fits the traditional positivist picture of science (observe-hypothesise-predict-observe). I like the definition of induction as 'comparison of experiences', because it doesn't reduce it to sequences of objects, and points to coherence.
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant]
     Full Idea: In the system of nature, man is a being of slight importance ....but man regarded as a person, that is as the subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted above any price.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 434 I.I)
     A reaction: See what you've done, John Locke? You've given yet another ground for claiming that humans are angels or demi-gods, exalted far above our animal cousins.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
I prefer the open sentences of a Constructibility Theory, to Platonist ideas of 'equivalence classes' [Chihara]
     Full Idea: What I refer to as an 'equivalence class' (of line segments of a particular length) is an open sentence in my Constructibility Theory. I just use this terminology of the Platonist for didactic purposes.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 09.10)
     A reaction: This is because 'equivalence classes' is committed to the existence of classes, which is Quinean Platonism. I am with Chihara in wanting a story that avoids such things. Kit Fine is investigating similar notions of rules of construction.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara]
     Full Idea: Causal theories of reference seem doomed to failure for the case of reference to mathematical entities, since such entities are evidently causally inert.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.3)
     A reaction: Presumably you could baptise a fictional entity such as 'Polonius', and initiate a social causal chain, with a tradition of reference. You could baptise a baby in absentia.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant]
     Full Idea: Moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbour, and respect for oneself (self-esteem). There is no obligation to have these, because they lie at the basis of morality, as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 399 Intro XII)
     A reaction: A bit of a revelation, this one, because I thought the only precondition for Kantian morality was rationality. Turns out that he agrees with Aristotle (Idea 46) that you can't started in morality if your heart isn't in the right place.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
     Full Idea: No moral principle is based on any feeling whatsoever.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 376 Pref)
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant]
     Full Idea: Love of man is required by itself, in order to present the world as a beautiful moral whole in its full perfection, even if no account is taken of advantages (of happiness).
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 458 I.II)
     A reaction: For me, this illustrates the basic problem with Kant. In the Groundwork he presents morality as arising from pure reason, deriving moral maxims from contradictions, but here we find a totally ungrounded assertion of grand traditional values.
All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant]
     Full Idea: All moral relations of rational beings, which involve a principle of the harmony of the will of one with another, can be reduced to love and respect. Love reduces one's will to another's end, and respect to another's right.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 488 II)
     A reaction: It all comes out too neat and tidy in Kant. Love doesn't merely focus on another person's 'ends', and respect should be for a lot more than another person's mere 'rights'. They'd have to be natural rights, because some societies restrict rights.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant]
     Full Idea: The duty of love for one's neighbour can be expressed as the duty to make others' ends my own (provided they are not immoral).
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 449 I.II)
     A reaction: An interesting idea. Kant's remarks on love and respect seem distorted, to shoehorn them into his system of end/means and maxims. If I love someone, should I continually enquire what their current ends are?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant]
     Full Idea: Only an end that is also a duty can be called a duty of virtue. ....[385] The necessary ends are one's own perfection, and the happiness of others.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 383 Intro II)
     A reaction: So virtues are a subset of duties. I don't think an Aristotelian virtue is anything like a duty. A soldier might do his duty, with no virtue at all. An even a Kantian categorical imperative duty can be formed without right feeling or good character.
Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant]
     Full Idea: Virtue is the strength of man's maxims in fulfilling his duty.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 394 Intro IX)
     A reaction: So virtue is just strong moral commitment. So what are we to make of the lists of distinctive virtues, found in every culture? How do they differ? Only in the areas of duty to which they refer? How do we possess some virtues without others?
The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant]
     Full Idea: The supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue is: Act in accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 395 Intro IX)
     A reaction: I'm not sure that any end can be a universal law. I certainly don't expect everyone to study philosophy. I suppose basic human ends, such as kindness and avoidance of suicide, are what he means. He's even more conformist than Aristotle!
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant]
     Full Idea: Affability, sociability, courtesy, hospitality and gentleness in argument ...are merely the manners one is obliged to show in social intercourse, ...and so they promote a virtuous disposition by at least making virtue fashionable.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 473-4 I.II App)
     A reaction: His emphasis on rational duty forces him to diminish virtue, making it sound hypocritical. He needs Aristotle's distinction between the controlled [enkratic] man and the man of true virtue (which is rational and whole-hearted).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant]
     Full Idea: If the practice of virtue were to become a habit the subject would suffer loss to that freedom in adopting his maxims which distinguishes an action done from duty.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 409 Intro XVI)
     A reaction: Looks like a misunderstanding of Aristotle, who always promotes the role of 'phronesis' [practical reason], and never advocates unthinking virtuous habits. I think Aristotle would ask how you select your maxim, if you lack the virtues.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant]
     Full Idea: Who will specify for me this mean between the two extremes? What distinguishes avarice (as a vice) from thrift (as a virtue) is not that avarice carries thift too far but that avarice has an entirely different principle (maxim).
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 404n Intro XIII)
     A reaction: He says one concerns enjoyment of possessions, and the other their mere possession. Similarly, reckless courage may aim at glory, while cowardice aims at survival. Aristotle is looking at circumstances, Kant at mental states.
If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant]
     Full Idea: If the mean between prodigality and avarice is supposed to be one of degree, then one vice would pass over into the opposite vice only through the virtue. So virtue would simply be a diminished, or rather a vanishing vice.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 432 I.I)
     A reaction: Interesting, but not convincing. Doesn't the thought equally show that vice is a vanishing virtue? Aristotle gives the example of the quantity of food we eat, which obviously passes from starvation to appropriate diet to gluttony.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant]
     Full Idea: To think of several virtues (as one unavoidably does) is nothing other than to think of the various moral objects to which the will is led by the one principle of virtue.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 406 Intro XIII)
     A reaction: So Kant commits to the Greek ideal of the unity of virtue - but not for Greek reasons. The unity of duty is what concerns Kant.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant]
     Full Idea: One can love one's neighbour though he might deserve but little respect, and can show him the respect necessary for every man regardless of the fact that he would hardly be judged worthy of love.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 448 I.II)
     A reaction: Not sure about this. Respect seems much clearer than love. You can train yourself and others to show respect, but you can't switch on love. Personally, I don't love strangers, but I try hard to respect them.
Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant]
     Full Idea: Respect ...is to be understood as the maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 449 I.II)
     A reaction: I can't see any direct connection between my own self-esteem and my respect for others, though in practice great vanity makes us neglect others. I also don't find the concept of 'dignity' very helpful. I think we should respect plants.
Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant]
     Full Idea: The duty of respect for my neighbour is contained in the maxim not to degrade any other man to a mere means to my ends (not to demand that another throw himself away in order to slave for my end).
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 449 I.II)
     A reaction: A weirdly narrow concept of respect. Is enslavement the only way to show disrespect? What about sneering at people, or ignoring them, or prejudicially depriving them of some benefit?
Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant]
     Full Idea: A duty of free respect towards others is only a negative one (of not exalting oneself above others) and is thus analogous to the duty of Right not to encroach upon what belongs to anyone.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 449 I.II)
     A reaction: Not good enough. He seems to think belongings are the main issue. By referring to one's own modesty, he has no way to indicate equality of respect (among races, ages, genders, religions, animals etc). Being humble does not entail being respectful.
Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant]
     Full Idea: The principle of mutual love admonishes men constantly to come closer to one another; that of the respect they owe one another, to keep themselves at a distance from one another.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 449 I.II)
     A reaction: It might be a situation where it is right to invoke the Golden Rule. Do we want others to be close to us all the time? Probably not. Respect wins, and love loses! Kant's makes a nice distinction. Respect is a virtue, and love is not.
We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant]
     Full Idea: I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a man; I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a man, even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 463 I.II)
     A reaction: The obvious way to find some respect for a vicious criminal is to ask how they got that way. Their state is almost certainly self-destructive, and not what they would ever have wished for. Would they choose eternal recurrence?
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant]
     Full Idea: The capacity to set oneself an end - any end whatsoever - is what characterises humanity (as distinguished from animality).
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 392 Intro VIII)
     A reaction: This appears to exclude animals which hunt, or build nests - but we have now hugely closed the gap between humans and other animals. I like this, because it chimes in with Sandel's Idea 21045.
Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant]
     Full Idea: Man is a being meant for society (though he is also an unsociable one).
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 471 I.II)
     A reaction: A striking contrast with Aristotle in Idea 5133. It is the difference between the communitarian and the liberal views of society. The latter values privacy and good fences.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant]
     Full Idea: Every deed that violates a man's right deserves punishment, the function of which is to avenge a crime on the one who committed it (not merely to make good the harm done). ...but no punishment may be inflicted out of hatred.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 460-1 I.II)
     A reaction: A fairly hideous idea, confirming the image of Kant as someone who coldly perfoms ruthless duties. I don't think Kant ever offers any clarity for the concepts of 'deserving' or of 'avenging'. What is the appropriate vengeance for theft?
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant]
     Full Idea: Man has duties only to men, ...since his duty to any other subject is moral constraint by that's subject's will. Hence the constraining (binding) subject must first be a person. Man can therefore have no duty to any beings other than men.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 442 I.I)
     A reaction: This is good for illuminating why I am not a Kantian. It is not just that animals are ruled out - it is that whether you show respect depends on whether the recipient passes some test or other. Humans with brain damage may fail the test.
Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant]
     Full Idea: Cruel treatment of animals is intimately opposed to man's duty to himself; ...for it dulls his shared feeling of their pain and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in relations with other men.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 443 I.I)
     A reaction: This idea is quite shocking. Kant's rough contemporary Bentham was far more enlightened. If we could be certain that our feelings of empathy for pain were not dulled by cruelty to animals, then it would be fine.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Gunk' is an individual possessing no parts that are atoms [Chihara]
     Full Idea: An 'atomless gunk' is defined to be an individual possessing no parts that are atoms.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], App A)
     A reaction: [Lewis coined it] If you ask what are a-toms made of and what are ideas made of, the only answer we can offer is that the a-toms are made of gunk, and the ideas aren't made of anything, which is still bad news for the existence of ideas.