Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science', 'Issues of Pragmaticism' and 'Primary Truths'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


3 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
An a priori proof is independent of experience [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An a priori proof is a proof independent of experience.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Primary Truths [1686])
     A reaction: Burge says Leibniz gave the first modern account of a priori knowledge. There may be no explicit reference to experience involved, but it would beg many questions to deny that implicit experience may be at the root of the proof.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Science is the reduction of diverse forces and powers to a smaller number that explain them [Kant]
     Full Idea: All natural philosophy consists in the reduction of given forces apparently diverse to a smaller number of forces and powers sufficient for the explication of the actions of the former.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science [1786], 534)
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think science is just tracking of complex forces and powers back to fundamental forces and powers. In which case, that is the analysis Kant is talking of. The standard model of physics would thrill him to bits.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1
     A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are.