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All the ideas for 'Wiener Logik', 'Philosophical Naturalism' and 'Shame and Necessity'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant]
     Full Idea: By dissection I can make the concept distinct only by making the marks it contains clear. That is what analysis does. If this analysis is complete ...and in addition there are not so many marks, then it is precise and so constitutes a definition.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.455), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
     A reaction: I think Aristotle would approve of this. We need to grasp that a philosophical definition is quite different from a lexicographical definition. 'Completeness' may involve quite a lot.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant]
     Full Idea: In logic the question is not one of contingent but of necessary rules, not how to think, but how we ought to think.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.16), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Trans'
     A reaction: Presumably it aspires to the objectivity of a single correct account of how we all ought to think. I'm sympathetic to that, rather than modern cultural relativism about reason. Logic is rooted in nature, not in arbitrary convention.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau]
     Full Idea: Some people view an externalist approach to epistemology as the essence of philosophical naturalism.
     From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], Intro)
     A reaction: I suspect philosophers avoid psychology and mental events, simply because they are elusive. Externalism is a theory about justification, and independent of naturalism as a metaphysic.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant]
     Full Idea: If we only know what we know ...we would be astonished by the treasures contained in our knowledge.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.843), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
     A reaction: Nice remark. He doesn't require immediat recall of knowledge. You can't be required to know that you know something. That doesn't imply externalism, though. I believe in securely founded internal knowledge which is hard to recall.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: There is a deluded Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom will totally coincide.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], VI - p.158)
There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: There is a problem of free will only for those who think that the notion of voluntary can be metaphysically deepened.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.68)
     A reaction: Years later, I now see that his refers to a pet hate of mine in discussions of free will, which is the idea that a person can have something called 'ultimate' responsibility for an action (which is the 'deep' version of 'you did it').
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau]
     Full Idea: Even dualists must explain how the mind represents things, but then their mind-stuff has so many special powers already (being outside space but in time, being transparent to itself etc.) that one more scarcely seems worth worrying about.
     From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 3.1 n1)
     A reaction: I share the exasperation. It is hard to see how a dualist could even begin to formulate a theory about HOW the mind does so many different things. Could Descartes get a research grant for it? Would we understand God if he tried to explain it to us?
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau]
     Full Idea: The functionalist approach to the mind needs to invoke assumptions about what desires are for and beliefs are about, in order to infer what agents will do.
     From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 3.2)
     A reaction: Isn't the idea that you discover what desires are for and what beliefs are about by examining their function, and what the agent does? Which end should we start?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
     Full Idea: Supervenience is a necessary condition for physicalism, but it is not sufficient. Epiphenomenalism rules out mental variation without physical variation, but says mental properties are quite distinct from physical properties.
     From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 1.2)
     A reaction: I take full epiphenomenalism about mind to be incoherent, and not worth even mentioning (see Idea 7379). Papineau seems to be thinking of so-called property dualism (which may also be incoherent!).
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
     Full Idea: The argument for supervenience rests on the principle that any mental difference must be capable of showing itself in differential physical consequences.
     From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 1.8)
     A reaction: With our current knowledge of the brain, to assume anything less than this sort of correlation would be crazy.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
     Full Idea: Physicalism does not deny that there are conscious experiences, nor that 'it is like something to have them'. The claim is only that this is nothing different from what it is to be a physical system of the relevant kind.
     From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 4.2)
     A reaction: The implication is that no physicalist is an extreme eliminativist about consciousness, which seems to be correct. We all concede that weather exists, but have a reductive view of it. The key question is whether mind is reducible to physics.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
     Full Idea: If functionalism implies that there is nothing physically in common among the realisations of a given mental state, then there is no possibility of any uniform explanation of why they all give rise to a common physical result.
     From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 2.2)
     A reaction: This is the well known interaction problem for dualism. The standard reply is to accept interaction as a given (with no apparent explanation). A miracle, if you like.
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau]
     Full Idea: I take the moral of the Private Language argument to be that there must be room for error in people's judgements about their experiences, not that those judgements must necessarily be expressed in a language used by a community.
     From: David Papineau (Philosophical Naturalism [1993], 4.4 n10)
     A reaction: These two readings don't seem to be in conflict, and the argument must have something to say about the communal nature of thought expressed in language. Language imposes introspection on us?
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
     Full Idea: Williams has shown that whether an action was weakness of will depends on an evaluation after the event, as in the question of whether Gauguin was right to abandon his family to pursue his art.
     From: report of Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993]) by John Cottingham - Reason, Emotions and Good Life p.1
     A reaction: The 'Gauguin Problem' is that Gauguin's actions only become weakness of will if the pictures are no good, and he can't know that till he's painted them. Good point.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The four elements of any conception of responsibility are cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.53)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: In what I have done, the guilt points in one direction towards what has happened to others, and the shame in another direction to what I am.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.92)
     A reaction: Not convinced. I think shame has the fear of being observed as an inescapable component. Even when alone shame involves imagining what others might think.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: There was moral progress in the ancient Greek world, notably to the extent that the idea of areté, human excellence, was freed to some extent from determination by social position.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], I - p.7)
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Duty in some abstract modern sense is largely unknown to the Greeks, in particular to archaic Greeks.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], II - p.41)
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The conception of the moral self as characterless leaves only a limited positive role to other people in one's moral life.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.95)
If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: If we think the power of reason is not enough by itself to distinguish good and bad, then we would hope that people have limited autonomy, that there is an internalised other in them that carries some social weight.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.100)
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: There is a "problem of evil" only for those who expect the world to be good.
     From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.68)