Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Posthumous notes', 'Problems in the Explanation of Action' and 'Julius Caesar'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Good reasons must give way to better [Shakespeare]
     Full Idea: Good reasons must of force give way to better.
     From: William Shakespeare (Julius Caesar [1599], 4.3.205)
     A reaction: [Brutus to Cassius] This remark is an axiom of rationality. But, of course, reasons can come in groups, and three modest reasons may compete with one very good reason.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality [Kant]
     Full Idea: Transcendental philosophy is the act of consciousness whereby the subject becomes the originator of itself and, thereby, of the whole object of technical-practical and moral-practical reason in one system - ordering all things in God
     From: Immanuel Kant (Posthumous notes [1799], 21:78, p.245), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 06 App
     A reaction: This is evidently Kant's last word on the matter (c.1799), and Moore says he was drifting close to Fichte's idealism, in which reality is actually (sort of) created by our own minds. Disappointing! God's role here is unclear.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R]
     Full Idea: Davidson's original account of intentions might still stand if we could accept that prior intentions are different in kind from intentions with which one acts.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Problems in the Explanation of Action [1987]) by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Davidson's'
     A reaction: Davidson says prior intention is all-out judgement of desirability. Prior intentions are more deliberate, with the other intentions as a presumed background to action. Compare Sartre's dual account of the self.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
The cause of my action is in my will [Shakespeare]
     Full Idea: The cause is in my will. I will not come./That is enough to satisfy the senate./But for your private satisfaction,/Because I love you, I will let you know.
     From: William Shakespeare (Julius Caesar [1599], II.ii)
     A reaction: This asserts the purest form of volitionism, but then qualifies it, because Caesar's will has been influenced by his wife's dreams.