4 ideas
21971 | Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality [Kant] |
Full Idea: Transcendental philosophy is the act of consciousness whereby the subject becomes the originator of itself and, thereby, of the whole object of technical-practical and moral-practical reason in one system - ordering all things in God | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Posthumous notes [1799], 21:78, p.245), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 06 App | |
A reaction: This is evidently Kant's last word on the matter (c.1799), and Moore says he was drifting close to Fichte's idealism, in which reality is actually (sort of) created by our own minds. Disappointing! God's role here is unclear. |
7006 | Observing irrelevant items supports both 'all x are y' and 'all x are non-y', revealing its absurdity [Schofield,J] |
Full Idea: Although Hempel's raven paradox produces an absurdity of irrelevant observations, we can ignore it because (unlike good observations) observing a white handbag supports the contradictions of 'ravens are black' and 'ravens are non-black'. | |
From: Jonathan Schofield (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The idea of 'eliminating it from our enquiries' cannot be totally irrational (e.g. in detective work), but it is only seriously sensible in a restricted domain (such as a country house) |
2605 | If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Fodor concludes that every predicate that a brain could learn to use must have a translation into the computer language of that brain. So no "new" concepts can be acquired: all concepts are innate! | |
From: Hilary Putnam (What is innate and why [1980], p.407) | |
A reaction: Some misunderstanding, surely? No one could be so daft as to think that everyone has an innate idea of an iPod. More basic innate building blocks for thought are quite plausible. |
2606 | No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Computers have a built-in language, but not a language that contains quantifiers (that is, the words "all" and "some"). …So generalizations (containing "all") cannot ever be stated in machine language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (What is innate and why [1980], p.408) | |
A reaction: Computers are too sophisticated to need quantification (which is crude). Computers can work with very precise and complex specifications of the domain of a given variable. |