17 ideas
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
Full Idea: By dissection I can make the concept distinct only by making the marks it contains clear. That is what analysis does. If this analysis is complete ...and in addition there are not so many marks, then it is precise and so constitutes a definition. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.455), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc' | |
A reaction: I think Aristotle would approve of this. We need to grasp that a philosophical definition is quite different from a lexicographical definition. 'Completeness' may involve quite a lot. |
6021 | It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.74) | |
A reaction: This makes assertions truth-bearers, rather than propositions. But a proposition can be true or false if it is stamped with a date and/or place. "Shakespeare was born in Stratford on 23rd April 1664". No one needs to assert that. |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
Full Idea: In logic the question is not one of contingent but of necessary rules, not how to think, but how we ought to think. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.16), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Trans' | |
A reaction: Presumably it aspires to the objectivity of a single correct account of how we all ought to think. I'm sympathetic to that, rather than modern cultural relativism about reason. Logic is rooted in nature, not in arbitrary convention. |
6020 | 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Definitions are identical to universal propositions in meaning, and only differ in syntax, for whoever says 'Man is a rational mortal animal' says the same thing in meaning as whoever says 'If something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal'. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 11.8) | |
A reaction: How strikingly like Bertrand Russell's interest and solutions. Sextus shows a straightforward interest in logical form, of a kind we associate with the twentieth century. Did Sextus Empiricus invent quantification? |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
Full Idea: If we only know what we know ...we would be astonished by the treasures contained in our knowledge. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.843), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc' | |
A reaction: Nice remark. He doesn't require immediat recall of knowledge. You can't be required to know that you know something. That doesn't imply externalism, though. I believe in securely founded internal knowledge which is hard to recall. |
6026 | How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: A preconception and conception must precede every object of investigation, for how can anyone even investigate without some conception of the object of investigation? | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.331a) | |
A reaction: The Duhem-Quine thesis about the 'theory-ladenness of observation' is just a revival of some routine ancient scepticism. As well as a conceptual scheme to accommodate the observation, there must also be some motivation for the investigation. |
5901 | Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham] |
Full Idea: Bentham has not made up his mind whether he thinks that 'right' means 'productive of the general happiness', or that being productive of the general happiness is what makes acts right (and he would have thought the difference unimportant). | |
From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §I | |
A reaction: The issue is whether rightness exists as a concept separate from happiness. I take it Bentham would vote for the first reading, as he has no interest in what is right, apart from increasing happiness. |
5934 | Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham] |
Full Idea: Most of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure refer to further pleasures, or are irrelevant to the pleasure; we are left with intensity and duration as the characteristics on which depend the value of a pleasure qua pleasure, and there is nothing to add. | |
From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §VI | |
A reaction: I agree. When Bentham produces his list he seems to be trying to add a bogus enrichment to what is really a rather crude and basic notion of the aim of life. Your simple hedonist appears to only desire high intensity and long duration. |
3777 | Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], I.1) | |
A reaction: Ridiculous. Both halves are false. We pursue things for other reasons, and to deny this makes his idea a tautology. Deep ecology has nothing to do with human pleasure or pain. |
6032 | Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Right action is whatever, once it has been done, has a reasonable justification. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 7.158) | |
A reaction: Why does he add 'once it has been done'? Wouldn't a proposed action be right if it had a reasonable justification? This grows out of the classical and Stoic emphasis on reason in ethics, and leads towards Scanlon's Contractualism. |
3554 | Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham] |
Full Idea: It is easy to fall into Bentham's mindless assumption that happiness must be a specific state of feeling good about something, but it is mysterious why anyone would think morality a good strategy for achieving this. | |
From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.7 |
3781 | The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham] |
Full Idea: It behoves the legislator to understand the force of pleasures and pains, which is their value. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], IV.1) |
3778 | The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham] |
Full Idea: The interest of the community is the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], I.4) |
20280 | Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham] |
Full Idea: A full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational animal than an infant of a day, or even a month, old. But suppose they be otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], XVIII 1 n), quoted by Peter Singer - Practical Ethics 03 | |
A reaction: This is certainly an inspiring, and even shocking question, which never seems to have been so directly asked before in the entire history of European thought. Awesome. |
3779 | Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Unnatural, when it means anything, means unfrequent. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], II.14 n8.9) |
1517 | The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature', because nature is a harmony of three concords (4th,5th and octave), and these ratios (4:3, 3:2, and 2:1) are found in the tektraktys. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 7.95) |
3780 | We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to know first whether a thing is right in order to know from thence whether it be conformable to the will of God. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], II.18) |