37 ideas
3358 | Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: In contemporary metaphysics the major areas of discussion are Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], After) |
3312 | There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: At least since Russell, one has routinely distinguished between the 'is' of predication ('Socrates is wise', Fx), the 'is' of identity ('Morning Star is Evening Star', =), and the 'is' of existence ('the cat is under the bed', Ex). | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: This seems horribly nitpicking to many people, but I love it - because it is just true, and it is a truth right at the basis of the confusions in our talk. Analytic philosophy forever! [P.S. 'Tiddles is a cat' - the 'is' membership] |
3352 | Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Analytical philosophy excels in the piecemeal analysis of causation, perception, knowledge and so on, but there is a striking poverty of any synoptic vision of these independent studies. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.22) |
3329 | Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: As our bible, the Book of Science is presumed to contain only true sentences, but it is less clear how they are to be construed, which literally and which non-literally. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
Full Idea: By dissection I can make the concept distinct only by making the marks it contains clear. That is what analysis does. If this analysis is complete ...and in addition there are not so many marks, then it is precise and so constitutes a definition. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.455), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc' | |
A reaction: I think Aristotle would approve of this. We need to grasp that a philosophical definition is quite different from a lexicographical definition. 'Completeness' may involve quite a lot. |
3326 | Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Set theory offers the promise of a complete mathematization of the 'is' of predication. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
3327 | The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Set inclusion is sharply distinguished from set membership (as the set of Greeks is found to be included in, but not a member of, the set of men). | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
3335 | The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG] |
Full Idea: Zermelo proposed seven axioms for set theory, with Fraenkel adding others, to produce the standard Z-F Intuition. | |
From: report of José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.17) by PG - Db (ideas) |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
Full Idea: In logic the question is not one of contingent but of necessary rules, not how to think, but how we ought to think. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.16), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Trans' | |
A reaction: Presumably it aspires to the objectivity of a single correct account of how we all ought to think. I'm sympathetic to that, rather than modern cultural relativism about reason. Logic is rooted in nature, not in arbitrary convention. |
3332 | Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The Greeks saw the independent science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.15) |
3330 | Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The Negative numbers are postulated (magic word) to solve x=5-8, Rationals postulated to solve 2x=3, Irrationals for x-squared=2, and Imaginaries for x-squared=-1. (…and Zero for x=5-5) …and x/0 remains eternally open. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.14) |
3337 | Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: One approaches the natural numbers in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory). | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.17) |
3310 | If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Once we conceded that Tom can walk slowly or quickly, and that the slowness and quickness is a property of the walking and not of Tom, we can hardly refrain from quantifying over events (such as 'a walking') in our ontology. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) |
12793 | Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: With their 'mass-noun' ontologies, the early pre-Socratics were blind to plurality ...but the count-noun ontologists came to dominate the field forever after. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: The mass-nouns are such things as earth, air, fire and water. This is a very interesting historical observation (cited by Laycock). Our obsession with identity seems tied to formal logic. There is a whole other worldview waiting out there. |
3353 | If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: How can you learn of the existence of transcendent Platonic objects if there is no causal interaction with them? | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.22) |
8915 | How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen] |
Full Idea: It is unclear how we manage to refer determinately to abstract entities in a sense in which it is not unclear how we manage to refer determinately to other things. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Abstract Objects [2001], 'Way of Ex') | |
A reaction: This is where problems of abstraction overlap with problems about reference in language. Can we have a 'baptism' account of each abstraction (even very large numbers)? Will descriptions do it? Do abstractions collapse into particulars when we refer? |
3304 | Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Why suppose these particles packed together constitute a macro-entity (namely, Mt Everest), whereas those, of equal number, scattered around, fail to add up to anything beyond themselves? | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 2) |
3350 | Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Is being a horse an essential property of a horse? Can we so much as conceive the abstract possibility of a horse's ceasing to be a horse even while continuing to exist? | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.20) |
3309 | If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: If a soldier need not cease to exist merely because he ceases to be a soldier, there is room to doubt that the wind ceases to exist when it ceases to be a wind. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) |
3351 | One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: One can step into the same river twice, but one must not expect to step into the same water. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.21) |
3314 | Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: With the thesis that to be as such is to be relative, the absolutist may be found to concur, but the issue turns on what it might be that a thing is supposed to be relative to. Why not itself? | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 8) |
3323 | Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: 'Existence' can't be glossed as self-identical (critics say) because Pegasus, even while being self-identical, fails to exist. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.11) |
3306 | The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: One proves non-existence (e.g. of round squares) by using logic to derive a contradiction from the concept; it is precisely here, in such proofs, that we find the clearest example of a priori knowledge. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4) |
3349 | If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Assume that we know to be true propositions of the form 'There are exactly x prime numbers between y and z', and synthetic a priori truths about Platonic objects are delivered to us on a silver platter. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
3341 | Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Logical positivism has been concisely summarised as 'there is no synthetic a priori'. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
3344 | Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: No one thinks that the proposition that something exists that transcends all possible experience harbours a logical inconsistency. Its denial cannot therefore be an analytic proposition, so it must be synthetic, though only knowable on a priori grounds. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
3345 | Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Appeals to intuition - no matter how informal - can hardly fail to smack of the synthetic a priori. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
Full Idea: If we only know what we know ...we would be astonished by the treasures contained in our knowledge. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.843), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc' | |
A reaction: Nice remark. He doesn't require immediat recall of knowledge. You can't be required to know that you know something. That doesn't imply externalism, though. I believe in securely founded internal knowledge which is hard to recall. |
8917 | The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen] |
Full Idea: The simplest version of the Way of Abstraction would be to say that an object is abstract if it is a referent of an idea that was formed by abstraction, but this is wedded to an outmoded philosophy of mind. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Abstract Objects [2001], 'Way of Abs') | |
A reaction: This presumably refers to Locke, who wields the highly ambiguous term 'idea'. But if we sort out that ambiguity (by using modern talk of mental events, concepts and content?) we might reclaim the view. But do we have a 'genetic fallacy' here? |
8912 | Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen] |
Full Idea: If any characterization of the abstract deserves to be regarded as the modern standard one, it is this: an abstract entity is a non-spatial (or non-spatiotemporal) causally inert thing. This view presents a number of perplexities... | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Abstract Objects [2001], 'Non-spat') | |
A reaction: As indicated in other ideas, the problem is that some abstractions do seem to be located somewhere in space-time, and to have come into existence, and to pass away. I like 'to exist is to have causal powers'. See Ideas 5992 and 8300. |
8913 | Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen] |
Full Idea: The natural view of chess is not that it is a non-spatiotemporal mathematical object, but that it was invented at a certain time and place, that it has changed over the years, and so on. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Abstract Objects [2001], 'Non-spat') | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being undeniable, and being an incredibly important point. Logicians seem to want to subsume things like games into the highly abstract world of logic and numbers. In fact the direction of explanation should be reversed. |
8914 | Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen] |
Full Idea: It is thought that sets are abstract, abstract objects do not exist in space, so sets must not exist in space. But it is not unnatural to say that a set of books is located on a certain shelf in the library. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Abstract Objects [2001], 'Non-spat') | |
A reaction: The arguments against non-spatiality of abstractions seem to me to be conclusive. Not being able to assign a location to the cosine function is on a par with not knowing where my thoughts are located in my brain. |
8916 | Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen] |
Full Idea: The Way of Conflation account of abstractions (identifying them sets or with universals) is now relatively rare. The claim sets or universals are the only abstract objects would amount to a substantive metaphysical thesis, in need of defence. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Abstract Objects [2001], 'Way of Con') | |
A reaction: If you produce a concept like 'mammal' by psychological abstraction, you do seem to end up with a set of things with shared properties, so this approach is not silly. I can't think of any examples of abstractions which are not sets or universals. |
8918 | Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen] |
Full Idea: On Frege's suggestion, functional terms that pick out abstract expressions (such as 'direction' or 'equinumeral') have a typical form of f(a) = f(b) iff aRb, where R is an equivalence relation, a relation which is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Abstract Objects [2001], 'Way of Abs') | |
A reaction: [Wright and Hale are credited with the details] This has become the modern orthodoxy among the logically-minded. Examples of R are 'parallel' or 'just as many as'. It picks out an 'aspect', which isn't far from the old view. |
8919 | Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen] |
Full Idea: It seems possible to define a train in terms of its carriages and the connection relationship, which would meet the equivalence account of abstraction, but demonstrate that trains are actually abstract. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Abstract Objects [2001], 'Way of Abs') | |
A reaction: [Compressed. See article for more detail] A tricky example, but a suggestive line of criticism. If you find two physical objects which relate to one another reflexively, symmetrically and transitively, they may turn out to be abstract. |
3334 | Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Rationalists have been happier with an ontology of points, and empiricists with an ontology of regions. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.16) |
3308 | In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: In the ontological argument a deep enough understanding of the very concept of God allows one to derive by logic a contradiction from the statement 'There is no God'. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4) |