39 ideas
3358 | Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: In contemporary metaphysics the major areas of discussion are Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], After) |
3312 | There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: At least since Russell, one has routinely distinguished between the 'is' of predication ('Socrates is wise', Fx), the 'is' of identity ('Morning Star is Evening Star', =), and the 'is' of existence ('the cat is under the bed', Ex). | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: This seems horribly nitpicking to many people, but I love it - because it is just true, and it is a truth right at the basis of the confusions in our talk. Analytic philosophy forever! [P.S. 'Tiddles is a cat' - the 'is' membership] |
3352 | Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Analytical philosophy excels in the piecemeal analysis of causation, perception, knowledge and so on, but there is a striking poverty of any synoptic vision of these independent studies. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.22) |
3329 | Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: As our bible, the Book of Science is presumed to contain only true sentences, but it is less clear how they are to be construed, which literally and which non-literally. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
Full Idea: By dissection I can make the concept distinct only by making the marks it contains clear. That is what analysis does. If this analysis is complete ...and in addition there are not so many marks, then it is precise and so constitutes a definition. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.455), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc' | |
A reaction: I think Aristotle would approve of this. We need to grasp that a philosophical definition is quite different from a lexicographical definition. 'Completeness' may involve quite a lot. |
3326 | Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Set theory offers the promise of a complete mathematization of the 'is' of predication. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
3327 | The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Set inclusion is sharply distinguished from set membership (as the set of Greeks is found to be included in, but not a member of, the set of men). | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
3335 | The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG] |
Full Idea: Zermelo proposed seven axioms for set theory, with Fraenkel adding others, to produce the standard Z-F Intuition. | |
From: report of José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.17) by PG - Db (ideas) |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
Full Idea: In logic the question is not one of contingent but of necessary rules, not how to think, but how we ought to think. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.16), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Trans' | |
A reaction: Presumably it aspires to the objectivity of a single correct account of how we all ought to think. I'm sympathetic to that, rather than modern cultural relativism about reason. Logic is rooted in nature, not in arbitrary convention. |
15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: I favour restricting the term 'logical truth' to what logicians would count as such, excluding both analytic truths like 'Bachelors are unmarried' and Kripkean necessities like 'Gold is an element'. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], I) | |
A reaction: I agree. There is a tendency to splash the phrases 'logical truth' and 'logical necessity around in vague ways. I take them to strictly arise out of the requirements of formal systems of logic. |
3332 | Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The Greeks saw the independent science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.15) |
3330 | Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The Negative numbers are postulated (magic word) to solve x=5-8, Rationals postulated to solve 2x=3, Irrationals for x-squared=2, and Imaginaries for x-squared=-1. (…and Zero for x=5-5) …and x/0 remains eternally open. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.14) |
3337 | Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: One approaches the natural numbers in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory). | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.17) |
3310 | If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Once we conceded that Tom can walk slowly or quickly, and that the slowness and quickness is a property of the walking and not of Tom, we can hardly refrain from quantifying over events (such as 'a walking') in our ontology. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) |
12793 | Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: With their 'mass-noun' ontologies, the early pre-Socratics were blind to plurality ...but the count-noun ontologists came to dominate the field forever after. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: The mass-nouns are such things as earth, air, fire and water. This is a very interesting historical observation (cited by Laycock). Our obsession with identity seems tied to formal logic. There is a whole other worldview waiting out there. |
15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: The view I now favour says that the causal features of a property, both forward-looking and backward-looking, are essential to it. And it says that properties having the same causal features are identical. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III) | |
A reaction: In this formulation we have essentialism about properties, as well as essentialism about the things which have the properties. |
15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: The controversial claim of my theory is that the causal features of properties are essential to them - are features that they have in all possible worlds. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III) | |
A reaction: One problem is that a property can come in degrees, so what degree of the property is necessary to it? It is better to assign this claim to the fundamental properties (which are best called 'powers'). |
15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: I now reject the formulation of the causal theory which says that a property is a cluster of conditional powers. That has a reductionist flavour, which is a cheat. We need properties to explain conditional powers, so properties won't reduce. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III) | |
A reaction: [compressed wording] I agree with Mumford and Anjum in preferring his earlier formulation. I think properties are broad messy things, whereas powers can be defined more precisely, and seem to have more stability in nature. |
3353 | If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: How can you learn of the existence of transcendent Platonic objects if there is no causal interaction with them? | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.22) |
3304 | Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Why suppose these particles packed together constitute a macro-entity (namely, Mt Everest), whereas those, of equal number, scattered around, fail to add up to anything beyond themselves? | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 2) |
3350 | Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Is being a horse an essential property of a horse? Can we so much as conceive the abstract possibility of a horse's ceasing to be a horse even while continuing to exist? | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.20) |
3309 | If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: If a soldier need not cease to exist merely because he ceases to be a soldier, there is room to doubt that the wind ceases to exist when it ceases to be a wind. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) |
3351 | One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: One can step into the same river twice, but one must not expect to step into the same water. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.21) |
3314 | Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: With the thesis that to be as such is to be relative, the absolutist may be found to concur, but the issue turns on what it might be that a thing is supposed to be relative to. Why not itself? | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 8) |
3323 | Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: 'Existence' can't be glossed as self-identical (critics say) because Pegasus, even while being self-identical, fails to exist. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.11) |
15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: If it is possible that there could be possible states of affairs that are not nomologically possible, don't we therefore need a notion of metaphysical possibility that outruns nomological possibility? | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI) | |
A reaction: Shoemaker rejects this possibility (p.425). I sympathise. So there is 'natural' possibility (my preferred term), which is anything which stuff, if it exists, could do, and 'logical' possibility, which is anything that doesn't lead to contradiction. |
15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Once the obstacle of the deeply rooted conviction that necessary truths should be knowable a priori is removed, ...causal necessity is (pretheoretically) the very paradigm of necessity, in ordinary usage and in dictionaries. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VII) | |
A reaction: The a priori route seems to lead to logical necessity, just by doing a priori logic, and also to metaphysical necessity, by some sort of intuitive vision. This is a powerful idea of Shoemaker's (implied, of course, in Kripke). |
15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: We have abundant empirical evidence that when we can imagine some phenomenal situation, e.g., imagine things appearing certain ways, such a situation could actually exist. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI) | |
A reaction: There seem to be good reasons for holding the opposite view too. We can imagine gold appearing to be all sorts of colours, but that doesn't make it possible. What does empirical evidence really tell us here? |
15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Imaginability can give us access to conceptual possibility, when we come to believe situations to be conceptually possible by reflecting on their descriptions and seeing no contradiction or incoherence. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI) | |
A reaction: If take the absence of contradiction to indicate 'logical' possibility, but the absence of incoherence is more interesting, even if it is a bit vague. He is talking of 'situations', which I take to be features of reality. A priori synthetic? |
3306 | The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: One proves non-existence (e.g. of round squares) by using logic to derive a contradiction from the concept; it is precisely here, in such proofs, that we find the clearest example of a priori knowledge. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4) |
3349 | If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Assume that we know to be true propositions of the form 'There are exactly x prime numbers between y and z', and synthetic a priori truths about Platonic objects are delivered to us on a silver platter. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
3341 | Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Logical positivism has been concisely summarised as 'there is no synthetic a priori'. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
3344 | Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: No one thinks that the proposition that something exists that transcends all possible experience harbours a logical inconsistency. Its denial cannot therefore be an analytic proposition, so it must be synthetic, though only knowable on a priori grounds. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
3345 | Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Appeals to intuition - no matter how informal - can hardly fail to smack of the synthetic a priori. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
Full Idea: If we only know what we know ...we would be astonished by the treasures contained in our knowledge. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.843), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc' | |
A reaction: Nice remark. He doesn't require immediat recall of knowledge. You can't be required to know that you know something. That doesn't imply externalism, though. I believe in securely founded internal knowledge which is hard to recall. |
15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Perhaps 'grue' has causal features, but only derivatively, in virtue of its relation to green. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III) | |
A reaction: I take grue to be a behaviour, and not a property at all. The problem only arises because the notion of a 'property' became too lax. Presumably Shoemaker should also mention blue in his account. |
15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: One way to get the conclusion that laws are necessary is to combine my view of properties with the view of Armstrong, Dretske and Tooley, that laws are, or assert, relations between properties. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], I) | |
A reaction: This is interesting, because Armstrong in particular wants the necessity to arise from relations between properties as universals, but if we define properties causally, and make them necessary, we might get the same result without universals. |
3334 | Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Rationalists have been happier with an ontology of points, and empiricists with an ontology of regions. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.16) |
3308 | In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: In the ontological argument a deep enough understanding of the very concept of God allows one to derive by logic a contradiction from the statement 'There is no God'. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4) |