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All the ideas for 'Wiener Logik', 'Theological and other works' and 'Logic as Semiotic: Theory of Signs'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition

18261	A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant]
	Full Idea: By dissection I can make the concept distinct only by making the marks it contains clear. That is what analysis does. If this analysis is complete ...and in addition there are not so many marks, then it is precise and so constitutes a definition.
	From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.455), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
	A reaction: I think Aristotle would approve of this. We need to grasp that a philosophical definition is quite different from a lexicographical definition. 'Completeness' may involve quite a lot.

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

22275	Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant]
	Full Idea: In logic the question is not one of contingent but of necessary rules, not how to think, but how we ought to think.
	From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.16), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Trans'
	A reaction: Presumably it aspires to the objectivity of a single correct account of how we all ought to think. I'm sympathetic to that, rather than modern cultural relativism about reason. Logic is rooted in nature, not in arbitrary convention.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers

15312	We get the idea of power by abstracting from ropes, magnets and electric shocks [Priestley]
	Full Idea: A rope sustains weight, a magnet attracts iron, a charged electrical jar gives a shock, and from these and other similar observations, we get the idea of power, universally and abstractly considered.
	From: Joseph Priestley (Theological and other works [1790], p.191), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B
	A reaction: I agree with this, in that we appear to be observing powers directly, and are not observing something which can then be reduced to non-powers. Nature just can't be a set of inert structures, with forces 'imposed' on them.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism

18260	If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant]
	Full Idea: If we only know what we know ...we would be astonished by the treasures contained in our knowledge.
	From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.843), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
	A reaction: Nice remark. He doesn't require immediat recall of knowledge. You can't be required to know that you know something. That doesn't imply externalism, though. I believe in securely founded internal knowledge which is hard to recall.

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

7634	Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund]
	Full Idea: For Peirce there are three different kinds of sign, which are different kinds of representation, built on different relationships: an 'icon' represents what it resembles, an 'index' is a natural sign, and a 'symbol' is a conventional sign.
	From: report of Charles Sanders Peirce (Logic as Semiotic: Theory of Signs [1897]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.4
	A reaction: Maund makes use of natural signs (like footprints) to explain representative perception. Peirce's distinctions seem useful in philosophy of mind generally, if the brain somehow represents what it experiences. How subjective are signs?

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter

15311	Attraction or repulsion are not imparted to matter, but actually constitute it [Priestley]
	Full Idea: Attraction or repulsion appear to me not to be properly what is imparted to matter, but what really makes it what it is, in so much that, without it, it would be nothing at all.
	From: Joseph Priestley (Theological and other works [1790], p.237), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B
	A reaction: This is music to the ears of anyone who thinks that powers are the fundamentals of nature (like me).