9212
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Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Possible states of affairs have often been taken to be propositions, but this cannot be correct, since any possible state of affairs is possibly a state of affairs, but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs.
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From:
Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
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A reaction:
The point is, presumably, that the state of affairs cannot be the proposition itself, but (at least) what the proposition refers to. I can't see any objection to that.
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9213
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The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
A possible world can't be defined (by Stalnaker and Plantinga) as a way the world might have been, because a possible world is possibly the world, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world.
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From:
Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
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A reaction:
His point is that any definition of a possible world must cover the actual world, because that is one of them. 'Might have been' is not applicable to the actual world. It seems a fairly important starting point for discussion of possible worlds.
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19542
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It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
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Full Idea:
The proposition that understanding does not involve knowledge is widespread (for example, in discussions of what philosophy aims at), but hardly withstands scrutiny. If you do not know how a jet engine works, you do not understand how it works.
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From:
Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.24)
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A reaction:
This seems a bit disingenuous. As in 'Theaetetus', knowing the million parts of a jet engine is not to understand it. More strongly - how could knowledge of an infinity of separate propositional truths amount to understanding on their own?
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19541
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Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
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Full Idea:
If we say our cognitive aim is to get knowledge, the opposing views are the naturalistic view that what matters is just true belief (or just 'getting by'), or that there are rival epistemic goods such as understanding and wisdom.
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From:
Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.17)
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A reaction:
[compressed summary] I'm a fan of understanding. The accumulation of propositional knowledge would relish knowing the mass of every grain of sand on a beach. If you say the propositions should be 'important', other values are invoked.
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