Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wiener Logik', 'The Problem of Possibilia' and 'Experience First (and reply)'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
18261 A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant]
     Full Idea: By dissection I can make the concept distinct only by making the marks it contains clear. That is what analysis does. If this analysis is complete ...and in addition there are not so many marks, then it is precise and so constitutes a definition.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.455), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
     A reaction: I think Aristotle would approve of this. We need to grasp that a philosophical definition is quite different from a lexicographical definition. 'Completeness' may involve quite a lot.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
22275 Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant]
     Full Idea: In logic the question is not one of contingent but of necessary rules, not how to think, but how we ought to think.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.16), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Trans'
     A reaction: Presumably it aspires to the objectivity of a single correct account of how we all ought to think. I'm sympathetic to that, rather than modern cultural relativism about reason. Logic is rooted in nature, not in arbitrary convention.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
9212 Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Possible states of affairs have often been taken to be propositions, but this cannot be correct, since any possible state of affairs is possibly a state of affairs, but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs.
     From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
     A reaction: The point is, presumably, that the state of affairs cannot be the proposition itself, but (at least) what the proposition refers to. I can't see any objection to that.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
9213 The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: A possible world can't be defined (by Stalnaker and Plantinga) as a way the world might have been, because a possible world is possibly the world, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world.
     From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
     A reaction: His point is that any definition of a possible world must cover the actual world, because that is one of them. 'Might have been' is not applicable to the actual world. It seems a fairly important starting point for discussion of possible worlds.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19542 It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
     Full Idea: The proposition that understanding does not involve knowledge is widespread (for example, in discussions of what philosophy aims at), but hardly withstands scrutiny. If you do not know how a jet engine works, you do not understand how it works.
     From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.24)
     A reaction: This seems a bit disingenuous. As in 'Theaetetus', knowing the million parts of a jet engine is not to understand it. More strongly - how could knowledge of an infinity of separate propositional truths amount to understanding on their own?
19543 To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
     Full Idea: An essential prerequisite for useful discussion of the relation between knowledge and understanding is systematic explicitness about what is to be known or understood.
     From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.25)
     A reaction: This is better. I say what needs to be known for understanding is the essence of the item under discussion (my PhD thesis!). Obviously understanding needs some knowledge, but I take it that epistemology should be understanding-first. That is the main aim.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19541 Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
     Full Idea: If we say our cognitive aim is to get knowledge, the opposing views are the naturalistic view that what matters is just true belief (or just 'getting by'), or that there are rival epistemic goods such as understanding and wisdom.
     From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.17)
     A reaction: [compressed summary] I'm a fan of understanding. The accumulation of propositional knowledge would relish knowing the mass of every grain of sand on a beach. If you say the propositions should be 'important', other values are invoked.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
18260 If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant]
     Full Idea: If we only know what we know ...we would be astonished by the treasures contained in our knowledge.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.843), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
     A reaction: Nice remark. He doesn't require immediat recall of knowledge. You can't be required to know that you know something. That doesn't imply externalism, though. I believe in securely founded internal knowledge which is hard to recall.