Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wiener Logik', 'Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology' and 'Concepts without Boundaries'

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10 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition

18261	A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant]
	Full Idea: By dissection I can make the concept distinct only by making the marks it contains clear. That is what analysis does. If this analysis is complete ...and in addition there are not so many marks, then it is precise and so constitutes a definition.
	From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.455), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
	A reaction: I think Aristotle would approve of this. We need to grasp that a philosophical definition is quite different from a lexicographical definition. 'Completeness' may involve quite a lot.

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

22275	Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant]
	Full Idea: In logic the question is not one of contingent but of necessary rules, not how to think, but how we ought to think.
	From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.16), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Trans'
	A reaction: Presumably it aspires to the objectivity of a single correct account of how we all ought to think. I'm sympathetic to that, rather than modern cultural relativism about reason. Logic is rooted in nature, not in arbitrary convention.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality

8983	If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: Sets have sharp boundaries, or are sharp objects; an object either definitely belongs to a set, or it does not. But 'red' is vague; there objects which are neither definitely red nor definitely not red. Hence there is no set of red things.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §2)
	A reaction: Presumably that will entail that there IS a set of things which can be described as 'definitely red'. If we describe something as 'definitely having a hint of red about it', will that put it in a set? In fact will the applicability of 'definitely' do?

7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation

8986	We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: We must reject the classical picture of classification by pigeon-holes, and think in other terms: classifying can be, and often is, clustering round paradigms.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §8)
	A reaction: His conclusion to a discussion of the problem of vagueness, where it is identified with concepts which have no boundaries. Pigeon-holes are a nice exemplar of the Enlightenment desire to get everything right. I prefer Aristotle's categories, Idea 3311.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

8982	Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: If a word is vague, there are or could be borderline cases, but non-vague expressions can also have borderline cases. The essence of vagueness is to be found in the idea vague concepts are concepts without boundaries.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], Intro)
	A reaction: He goes on to say that vague concepts are not embodied in clear cut sets, which is what gives us our notion of a boundary. So what is vague is 'membership'. You are either a member of a club or not, but when do you join the 'middle-aged'?

8984	If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: Vague concepts are boundaryless, ...and the manifestations are an unwillingness to draw any such boundaries, the impossibility of identifying such boundaries, and needlessness and even disutility of such boundaries.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §5)
	A reaction: People have a very fine-tuned notion of whether the sharp boundary of a concept is worth discussing. The interesting exception are legal people, who are often forced to find precision where everyone else hates it. Who deserves to inherit the big house?

8985	Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury]
	Full Idea: Boundaryless concepts tend to come in systems of contraries: opposed pairs like child/adult, hot/cold, weak/strong, true/false, and complex systems of colour terms. ..Only a contrast with 'adult' will show what 'child' excludes.
	From: Mark Sainsbury (Concepts without Boundaries [1990], §5)
	A reaction: This might be expected. It all comes down to the sorites problem, of when one thing turns into something else. If it won't merge into another category, then presumably the isolated concept stays applicable (until reality terminates it? End of sheep..).

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues

19729	'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T]
	Full Idea: In 'modal epistemologies' a belief counts as knowledge only if there is a modal connection - a connection not only to the actual world, but also to other non-actual possible worlds - between the belief and the facts of the matter.
	From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1)
	A reaction: [Pritchard 2005 seems to be a source for this] This sounds to me a bit like Nozick's tracking or sensitivity theory. Nozick is, I suppose, diachronic (time must pass, for the tracking), where this theory is synchronic.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem

19728	Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T]
	Full Idea: The protagonists in Gettier cases and in lottery cases fail to have knowledge because their beliefs are true simply as a matter of luck, where this means that their beliefs themselves are not appropriately connected to the facts.
	From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1)
	A reaction: The lottery problem is you correctly believe 'my ticket won't win the lottery' even though you don't seem to actually know it won't. Is the Gettier problem simply the problem of lucky knowledge? 'Luck' is a rather vague concept.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism

18260	If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant]
	Full Idea: If we only know what we know ...we would be astonished by the treasures contained in our knowledge.
	From: Immanuel Kant (Wiener Logik [1795], p.843), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
	A reaction: Nice remark. He doesn't require immediat recall of knowledge. You can't be required to know that you know something. That doesn't imply externalism, though. I believe in securely founded internal knowledge which is hard to recall.