Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Journals', 'Iteration Again' and 'Belief Truth and Knowledge'

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
13547 Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter]
     Full Idea: Weak Limitation of Size: If there are no more Fs than Gs and the Gs form a collection, then Fs form a collection. Strong Limitation of Size: A property F fails to be collectivising iff there are as many Fs as there are objects.
     From: report of George Boolos (Iteration Again [1989]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 13.5
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
3900 Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: Armstrong has argued that experience, as normally understood, is not necessary to perception. To perceive is to acquire beliefs, through a causal process.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973]) by Roger Scruton - Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey 23.4
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
4253 Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Externalist accounts of non-inferential knowledge say what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural relation which holds between the belief state and the situation which makes the belief true.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973], 11.III.6)
     A reaction: Armstrong's concept is presumably a response to Quine's desire to 'naturalise epistemology'. Bad move, I suspect. It probably reduces knowledge to mere true belief, and hence a redundant concept.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
16707 Cold and hot are the swiftness and slowness of corpuscular motion [Beeckman]
     Full Idea: There is no doubt that the nature of cold and hot are taken from the swiftness and slowness of the motion of corpuscules.
     From: Isaac Beeckman (Journals [1617], I:132), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 19.6
     A reaction: This is so right it takes your breath away. For 'corpuscles' we should normally read 'molecules'. Atomism is a further refinement. This is the rejection of the orthodox view of separate qualities.