7068
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If infatuation with science leads to bad scientism, its rejection leads to obscurantism [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
If what is mistaken in much contemporary philosophy is its infatuation with science, which leads to scientism, then the equally mistaken rejection of science leads to obscurantism.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001], Ch.1)
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A reaction:
Clearly a balance has to be struck. I take philosophy to be a quite separate discipline from science, but it is crucial that philosophy respects the physical facts, and scientists are the experts there. Scientists are philosophers' most valued servants.
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7075
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To meet the division in our life, try the Subject, Nature, Spirit, Will, Power, Praxis, Unconscious, or Being [Critchley]
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Full Idea:
Against the Kantian division of a priori and empirical, Fichte offered activity of the subject, Schelling offered natural force, Hegel offered Spirit, Schopenhauer the Will, Nietzsche power, Marx praxis, Freud the unconscious, and Heidegger offered Being.
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From:
Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001])
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A reaction:
The whole of Continental Philosophy summarised in a sentence. Fichte and Schopenhauer seem to point to existentialism, Schelling gives evolutionary teleology, Marx abandons philosophy, the others are up the creek.
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8506
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Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
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Full Idea:
I favour the Realist view that while we can distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties, but the two 'factors' are too intimately together to speak of a relation between them.
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From:
David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
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A reaction:
Is Armstrong being a bit of an ostrich here? We could talk of part-whole relationships, or internal relations, or set membership, or coinciding objects, or bundles. We certainly ought to have a go. Armstrong approaches Quine here!
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16746
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Principles of things are not hidden features of forms, but the laws by which they were formed [Newton]
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Full Idea:
The (active) principles I consider not as occult qualities, supposed to result from the specific forms of things, but as general laws of nature, by which the things themselves are formed.
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From:
Isaac Newton (Queries to the 'Opticks' [1721], q 31), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6
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A reaction:
This is the external, 'imposed' view of laws (with the matter passive) at its most persuasive. If laws arise out the stuff (as I prefer to think), what principles went into the formulation of the stuff?
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