17 ideas
13152 | We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton] |
Full Idea: If any man shall take the words number and sum in a larger sense, to understand things which are numberless and sumless (such as the infinite points on a line), I could allow him the contradictious phrase 'innumerable number' without absurdity. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.02.25) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I take the key point here to be the phrase of taking number 'in a larger sense'. Like the word 'atom' in physics, the word 'number' retains its traditional reference, but has considerably shifted its scope. Amateurs must live with this. |
13151 | Not all infinites are equal [Newton] |
Full Idea: It is an error that all infinites are equal. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.01.17) | |
A reaction: There follows a discussion of the mathematicians' view of infinity. Cantor was not the first to notice that there is more than one sort of of infinity. |
8439 | Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Perhaps it is impossible that an event should have had a causal history different from the one that it actually had. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.220) | |
A reaction: [He cites van Inwagen for this] The idea is analagous to baptismal accounts of reference. Individuate an event by its history. It might depend (as Davidson implies) on how you describe the event. |
8440 | Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett] |
Full Idea: It has been argued that an event's time of occurrence is essential to it. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.221) | |
A reaction: [He cites Lawrence Lombard] This sound initially implausible, particularly if a rival event happened, say, .1 of a second later than the actual event. It might depend on one's view about determinism. Interesting. |
13856 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington] |
Full Idea: Grice argued that the truth-functional account of conditionals can withstand objections, provided that we are careful to distinguish the false from the misleadingly true. | |
From: report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? 2 |
8948 | The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher] |
Full Idea: According to Grice, it is the rules that govern conversation beyond the merely logical that account for the counter-intuitiveness of the truth table for the material conditional. | |
From: report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Jennifer Fisher - On the Philosophy of Logic 8.I | |
A reaction: There is a conversational rule which says that replies should normally relevant to context. It would be nice if logical implications were also relevant to context. |
13767 | Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice] |
Full Idea: Grice defended the truth-functional account of conditionals, noting the gap between what we are justified in believing and what is appropriate to say. .But the problem arises at the level of belief, not at the level of inappropriate conversational remarks | |
From: comment on H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals 17.1.3 |
14277 | A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington] |
Full Idea: Grice drew attention to situations in which a person is justified in believing a proposition, which would nevertheless by an unreasonable thing for the person to say, in normal circumstances. I think he is right about disjunction and negated conjunctions. | |
From: report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 2.4 | |
A reaction: Edgington considers Grice's ideas of implicature as of permanent value, especially as a clarification of 1950s ordinary language philosophy. |
8441 | Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Although you cannot cause a fire by delaying something's burning, you can cause a fire by hastening something's burning. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.223) | |
A reaction: A very nice observation which brings out all sorts of problems about identifying causes. Bennett is criticising the counterfactual account. It is part of the problem of pre-emption, where causes are queueing up to produce a given effect. |
8436 | Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett] |
Full Idea: We must choose between subsumption and counterfactual analyses of causal statements. The former means that cause and effect have some properties that enables them to be subsumed under a conditional. The latter is just 'if no-c then no-e'. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.217) | |
A reaction: I have an immediate preference for the former account, which seems to potentially connect it with physics and features of the world which make one thing lead to another. The counterfactual account seems very thin, and is more like mere semantics. |
8435 | Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Theories of causation are split between event and fact/state of affairs theories. The first have the form 'the explosion caused the fire' (perfect nominals) and the second have the form 'the fire started because a bomb dropped' (sentential clauses). | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987]) | |
A reaction: Surely events must have priority? The form which uses facts is drifting off into explanation, and is much more likely to involve subjective human elements and interpretations. Events are closer to the physics, and the mechanics of what happens. |
8437 | The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett] |
Full Idea: The refinement of a simple counterfactual analysis is to say that cause and effect depend on a series of events. This must be asserted because counterfactual conditionals are well known not to be transitive. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987]) | |
A reaction: This fills out the theory, but offers another target for critics. If the glue that binds the series is not in the counterfactuals, is it just in the mind of the speaker? How do you decide what's in the series? Cf. deciding offside in football (soccer!). |
8438 | A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Any counterfactual about a particular event implies or presupposes something about the event's essence. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.219) | |
A reaction: This is where the counterfactual theory suddenly becomes more interesting, instead of just being a rather bare account of the logical structure of causation. (Bennett offers some discussion of possible essential implications). |
15863 | The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton] |
Full Idea: When I wrote my treatise about our system, I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men, for the belief of a deity. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1692.12.10) | |
A reaction: Harré quotes this, and it shows that the rather passive view of nature Newton developed was to be supplemented by the active power of God. Without God, we need a more active view of nature. |
8340 | I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton] |
Full Idea: You sometimes speak of gravity as essential and inherent in matter. Pray do no ascribe that notion to me; for the cause of gravity is what I do not pretend to know. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.01.17) | |
A reaction: I take science to be a two-stage operation - first we discern the regularities, and then we explain them. Evolution was spotted, then explained by Darwin. Cancer from cigarettes was spotted, but hasn't been explained. Regularity is the beginning. |
13150 | The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton] |
Full Idea: The motions which the planets now have could not spring from any natural cause alone, but were impressed by an intelligent agent. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1692.12.10) | |
A reaction: He is writing to a cleric, but seems to be quite sincere about this. Elsewhere he just says he doesn't know what causes gravity. |
12178 | That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton] |
Full Idea: That gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter ...is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.02.25) | |
A reaction: He is replying to some sermons, and he pays vague lip service to a possible divine force. Nevertheless, this is thoroughgoing anti-essentialism, and he talks of external 'laws' in the next sentence. Newton still sought the cause of gravity. |