Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Bentley', 'Analogy of Religion' and 'The Symposium'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The finest branch of wisdom is justice and moderation in ordering states and families [Plato]
     Full Idea: By far the greatest and fairest branch of wisdom is that which is concerned with the due ordering of states and families, whose name is moderation and justice.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 209a)
     A reaction: ['Justice' is probably 'dikaiosune'] It is hard to disagree with this, and it relegates ivory tower philosophical contemplation to second place, unlike the late books of Aristotle's Ethics.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton]
     Full Idea: If any man shall take the words number and sum in a larger sense, to understand things which are numberless and sumless (such as the infinite points on a line), I could allow him the contradictious phrase 'innumerable number' without absurdity.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.02.25)
     A reaction: [compressed] I take the key point here to be the phrase of taking number 'in a larger sense'. Like the word 'atom' in physics, the word 'number' retains its traditional reference, but has considerably shifted its scope. Amateurs must live with this.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Not all infinites are equal [Newton]
     Full Idea: It is an error that all infinites are equal.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.01.17)
     A reaction: There follows a discussion of the mathematicians' view of infinity. Cantor was not the first to notice that there is more than one sort of of infinity.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik]
     Full Idea: According to Diotima, the Forms are the objects of desire operative in philosophical discourse.
     From: report of Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210a4-) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.199
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler]
     Full Idea: When a man swears to the same tree having stood for fifty years in the same place, he means ...not that the tree has been all that time the same in the strict philosophical sense of the word. ...In a loose and popular sense they are said to be the same.
     From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1)
     A reaction: A helpful distinction which we should hang on. Of course, by the standards of modern physics, nothing is strictly the same from one Planck time to the next. All is flux. So we either drop the word 'same' (for objects) or relax a bit.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato]
     Full Idea: There is a state of mind half-way between wisdom and ignorance - having true opinions without being able to give reasons for them.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 202a)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 2140, where Plato scorns this state of mind. What he describes could be split into two - purely lucky true beliefs, and 'externalist knowledge', with non-conscious justification.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
     Full Idea: Though the successive consciousnesses which we have of our own existence are not the same, yet they are consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object; of the same person, self, or living agent.
     From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1)
     A reaction: Butler's arguments seems to be that he appears to be the same person, so he is the same person. He is explicitly disagreeing with Locke.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler]
     Full Idea: Though consciousness of what is past does ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons is to say a person has not existed a single moment but what he can remember.
     From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1)
     A reaction: An over-cautious scepticism has crept in about the reliability of bodily identity. Now we can have photographs and CCTV to prove that we experienced events we have forgotten. Butler is right.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler]
     Full Idea: One would think it really self-evident that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any more than knowledge can presuppose truth, which it presupposes.
     From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1)
     A reaction: It rather begs the question to dogmatically assert that mere consciousness presupposes a self, especially after Hume's criticisms. That consciousness implies a subject to experience needs arguing for. Is it the best explanation?
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler]
     Full Idea: If personality is a transient thing ...then it follows that it is a fallacy to charge ourselves with any thing we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any thing which befell us yesterday, or what will befall us tomorrow.
     From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1)
     A reaction: We seem to care about the past and future of our children, without actually being our children. Can't my future self be my descendant, a close one, instead of me?
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato]
     Full Idea: During the period from boyhood to old age, man does not retain the same attributes, though he is called the same person.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 207d)
     A reaction: This precisely identifies the basic problem of personal identity over time. If this is the problem, DNA looks more and more significant for the answer, though it would be an awful mistake to think a pattern of DNA was a person.
Only the gods stay unchanged; we replace our losses with similar acquisitions [Plato]
     Full Idea: We retain identity not by staying the same (the preserve of gods) but by replacing losses with new similar acquisitions.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 208b)
     A reaction: Any modern student of personal identity should be intrigued by this remark! It appears to take a rather physical view of the matter, and to be aware of human biology as a process. Are my continuing desires token-identical, or just 'similar'?
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty and goodness are the same [Plato]
     Full Idea: What is good is the same as what is beautiful.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 201c)
Beauty is harmony with what is divine, and ugliness is lack of such harmony [Plato]
     Full Idea: Ugliness is out of harmony with everything that is godly; beauty, however, is in harmony with the divine.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 206d)
     A reaction: This remark shows how the concept of 'harmony' is at the centre of Greek thought (and is a potential bridge of the is/ought gap).
Love of ugliness is impossible [Plato]
     Full Idea: There cannot be such a thing as love of ugliness.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 201a)
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Stage two is the realisation that beauty of soul is of more value than beauty of body [Plato]
     Full Idea: The second stage of progress is to realise that beauty of soul is more valuable than beauty of body.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210b)
Progress goes from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, and reaches absolute beauty [Plato]
     Full Idea: One should step up from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, until at last one knows what absolute beauty is.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 211c)
     A reaction: Presumably this is why Socrates refused sexual favours to Alcibiades. The idea is inspiring, and yet it is a rejection of humanity.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is a knowledge of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm [Plato]
     Full Idea: Music may be called a knowledge of the principles of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 187c)
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato]
     Full Idea: Wisdom is one of the most beautiful of things, and Love is love of beauty, so it follows that Love must be a love of wisdom.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 204b)
     A reaction: Good, but wisdom isn't the only exceptionally beautiful thing. Music is beautiful partly because it is devoid of ideas.
Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato]
     Full Idea: Phaedrus: Love is not only the oldest and most honourable of the gods, but also the most powerful to assist men in the acquisition of merit and happiness, both here and hereafter.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 180b)
     A reaction: Maybe we should talk less of love as a feeling, and more as a motivation, not just in human relationships, but in activities like gardening and database compilation.
Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato]
     Full Idea: Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 206a)
     A reaction: Even the worst human beings often have lovers. 'Perpetual' is a nice observation.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato]
     Full Idea: 'What will be gained by a man who is good?' 'That is easy - he will be happy'.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 205a)
     A reaction: Suppose you tried to assassinate Hitler in 1944 (a good deed), but failed. Happiness presumably results from success, rather than mere good intentions.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Happiness is secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful [Plato]
     Full Idea: By happy you mean in secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful? - Certainly.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 202c)
     A reaction: We seem to have lost track of the idea that beauty might be an essential ingredient of happiness.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The only slavery which is not dishonourable is slavery to excellence [Plato]
     Full Idea: The only form of servitude which has no dishonour has for its object the acquisition of excellence.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 184c)
The first step on the right path is the contemplation of physical beauty when young [Plato]
     Full Idea: The man who would pursue the right way to his goal must begin, when he is young, by contemplating physical beauty.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210a)
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton]
     Full Idea: When I wrote my treatise about our system, I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men, for the belief of a deity.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1692.12.10)
     A reaction: Harré quotes this, and it shows that the rather passive view of nature Newton developed was to be supplemented by the active power of God. Without God, we need a more active view of nature.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton]
     Full Idea: You sometimes speak of gravity as essential and inherent in matter. Pray do no ascribe that notion to me; for the cause of gravity is what I do not pretend to know.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.01.17)
     A reaction: I take science to be a two-stage operation - first we discern the regularities, and then we explain them. Evolution was spotted, then explained by Darwin. Cancer from cigarettes was spotted, but hasn't been explained. Regularity is the beginning.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton]
     Full Idea: The motions which the planets now have could not spring from any natural cause alone, but were impressed by an intelligent agent.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1692.12.10)
     A reaction: He is writing to a cleric, but seems to be quite sincere about this. Elsewhere he just says he doesn't know what causes gravity.
That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton]
     Full Idea: That gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter ...is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.02.25)
     A reaction: He is replying to some sermons, and he pays vague lip service to a possible divine force. Nevertheless, this is thoroughgoing anti-essentialism, and he talks of external 'laws' in the next sentence. Newton still sought the cause of gravity.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Gods are not lovers of wisdom, because they are already wise [Plato]
     Full Idea: No god is a lover of wisdom or desires to be wise, for he is wise already.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 204a)