Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Bentley', 'The Virtues and Human Nature' and 'Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
     Full Idea: The golden age of analytic philosophy (mid 20th c) was when necessary, a priori and analytic were one, all possibility was linguistic possibility, and the linguistic turn gave philosophy a respectable subject matter (language), and precision and rigour.
     From: Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.166)
     A reaction: Gently sarcastic, because Soames is part of the team who have put a bomb under this view, and quite right too. Personally I think the biggest enemy in all of this lot is not 'language' but 'rigour'. A will-o-the-wisp philosophers dream of.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
     Full Idea: If all of philosophy is the analysis of meaning, and meaning is fundamentally transparent to competent speakers, there is little room for philosophically significant explanations and theories, since they will be necessary or a priori, or both.
     From: Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.186)
     A reaction: He cites the later Wittgenstein as having fallen into this trap. I suppose any area of life can have its specialists, but I take Shakespeare to be a greater master of English than any philosopher I have ever read.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton]
     Full Idea: If any man shall take the words number and sum in a larger sense, to understand things which are numberless and sumless (such as the infinite points on a line), I could allow him the contradictious phrase 'innumerable number' without absurdity.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.02.25)
     A reaction: [compressed] I take the key point here to be the phrase of taking number 'in a larger sense'. Like the word 'atom' in physics, the word 'number' retains its traditional reference, but has considerably shifted its scope. Amateurs must live with this.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Not all infinites are equal [Newton]
     Full Idea: It is an error that all infinites are equal.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.01.17)
     A reaction: There follows a discussion of the mathematicians' view of infinity. Cantor was not the first to notice that there is more than one sort of of infinity.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
     Full Idea: By (Kripkean) 'essential' properties and relations I mean simply properties and relations that hold necessarily of objects (in all genuinely possible world-states in which the objects exist).
     From: Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.168 n5)
     A reaction: This is the standard modern view of essences which I find so unsatisfactory. Kit Fine has helped to take us back to the proper Aristotelian view, where 'necessary' and 'essential' actually have different meanings. Note the inclusion of relations.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
     Full Idea: None of Kripke's many achievements is more important than his breaking the spell of the linguistic as the source of philosophically important modalities.
     From: Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.186)
     A reaction: Put like that, Kripke may have had the single most important thought of modern times. I take good philosophy to be exactly the same as good scientific theorising, in that it all arises out of the nature of reality (and I include logic in that).
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
     Full Idea: For the Kripkean possible states of the world are not alternate concrete universes, but abstract objects. Metaphysically possible world-states are maximally complete ways the real concrete universe could have been.
     From: Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.167)
     A reaction: This is probably clearer about the Kripkean view than Kripke ever is, but then that is part of Soames's mission. It sounds like the right way to conceive possible worlds. At least there is some commitment there, rather than instrumentalism about them.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
     Full Idea: Two-dimensionalism is a fundamentally anti-Kripkean attempt to reinstate descriptivism about names and natural kind terms, to reconnect necessity and apriority to analyticity, and return philosophy to analytic paradigms of its golden age.
     From: Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.183)
     A reaction: I presume this is right, and it is so frustrating that you need Soames to spell it out, when Chalmers is much more low-key. Philosophers hate telling you what their real game is. Why is that?
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver]
     Full Idea: Motives will cause persons for form intentions; it is intentions which more directly guide actions.
     From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3)
     A reaction: This is invites the question of whether there is a sharp distinction between the motive and the action. Detectives look for motives, but law courts look for intentions.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver]
     Full Idea: I deny the claim that good intentions are necessary for virtue.
     From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3)
     A reaction: Presumably one could continually do the right thing, because it was your duty or your job, without actually being well motivated for it.
Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver]
     Full Idea: The behavioural aspects of virtue are more important than its phenomenology, because virtue is best defined along consequentialist lines.
     From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the thesis of her paper. Quite persuasive. Consequences are, of course, important in all moral theories (even Kant's). She doesn't rely on human nature. The social virtues vary according to the circumstances, such as gossiping in wartime.
Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver]
     Full Idea: A moral virtue is a character trait (a disposition or cluster of dispositions) which, generally speaking, produces good consequences for others.
     From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3)
     A reaction: There are self-directed virtues, such as keeping fit and healthy. There are virtues for ways to receive the kindness of others. That said, I like this idea.
Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver]
     Full Idea: Women now have more control over becoming pregnant. Men can now be more certain of paternity, without the constraint of female chastity. Hence chastity is no longer considered a moral virtue.
     From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5)
     A reaction: A persuasive argument that virtues are defined by their consequences (to which I add my example of gossiping in wartime). Different social situations and crises promote or relegate the status of certain virtues (such as food hoarding).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver]
     Full Idea: If generosity towards the needy in the long run produced [social] parasites, and if generosity did this systematically, then it would not be a moral virtue.
     From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5)
     A reaction: A very persuasive example. Hume has similar views - that we encourage those emotions which have good social outcomes.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton]
     Full Idea: When I wrote my treatise about our system, I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men, for the belief of a deity.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1692.12.10)
     A reaction: Harré quotes this, and it shows that the rather passive view of nature Newton developed was to be supplemented by the active power of God. Without God, we need a more active view of nature.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton]
     Full Idea: You sometimes speak of gravity as essential and inherent in matter. Pray do no ascribe that notion to me; for the cause of gravity is what I do not pretend to know.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.01.17)
     A reaction: I take science to be a two-stage operation - first we discern the regularities, and then we explain them. Evolution was spotted, then explained by Darwin. Cancer from cigarettes was spotted, but hasn't been explained. Regularity is the beginning.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton]
     Full Idea: The motions which the planets now have could not spring from any natural cause alone, but were impressed by an intelligent agent.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1692.12.10)
     A reaction: He is writing to a cleric, but seems to be quite sincere about this. Elsewhere he just says he doesn't know what causes gravity.
That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton]
     Full Idea: That gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter ...is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.02.25)
     A reaction: He is replying to some sermons, and he pays vague lip service to a possible divine force. Nevertheless, this is thoroughgoing anti-essentialism, and he talks of external 'laws' in the next sentence. Newton still sought the cause of gravity.