18 ideas
| 5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps the modern view is best expressed as saying that "water" has no definition at all, at least in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance. | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
| A reaction: This assumes that proper names have no definitions, though I am not clear how we can grasp the name 'Aristotle' without some association of properties (human, for example) to go with it. We need a definition of 'definition'. |
| 5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: We can refer to Thales by using the name "Thales" even though perhaps the only description we can supply is false of him. | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
| A reaction: It is not clear what we would be referring to if all of our descriptions (even 'Greek philosopher') were false. If an archaeologist finds just a scrap of stone with a name written on it, that is hardly a sufficient basis for successful reference. |
| 5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: The traditional theory of proper names entails that at least some combination of the things ordinarily believed of Aristotle are necessarily true of him. | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §III) | |
| A reaction: Searle endorses this traditional theory. Kripke and co. tried to dismiss it, but you can't. If all descriptions of Aristotle turned out to be false (it was actually the name of a Persian statue), our modern references would have been unsuccessful. |
| 13152 | We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton] |
| Full Idea: If any man shall take the words number and sum in a larger sense, to understand things which are numberless and sumless (such as the infinite points on a line), I could allow him the contradictious phrase 'innumerable number' without absurdity. | |
| From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.02.25) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] I take the key point here to be the phrase of taking number 'in a larger sense'. Like the word 'atom' in physics, the word 'number' retains its traditional reference, but has considerably shifted its scope. Amateurs must live with this. |
| 13151 | Not all infinites are equal [Newton] |
| Full Idea: It is an error that all infinites are equal. | |
| From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.01.17) | |
| A reaction: There follows a discussion of the mathematicians' view of infinity. Cantor was not the first to notice that there is more than one sort of of infinity. |
| 22167 | Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Augustine says bodies don't form images in our spirit; our spirit does that itself with amazing quickness. ...So the appearances under which mind knows things aren't drawn from the things themselves. | |
| From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Thomas Aquinas - Quodlibeta 8.2.1 | |
| A reaction: This is Augustine's theory of 'illumination' - that God creates experience within us. His theory was soon discarded by the early scholastics. |
| 22117 | Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews] |
| Full Idea: Instead of supposing that what we know can be abstracted from sensible particulars that instantiate such knowledge, Augustine insists that our mind is so constituted as to see 'intelligible realities' directly by inner illumination. | |
| From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.74 | |
| A reaction: His 'theory of illumination'. This seems to be a sort of super-rationalism. This doesn't make clear the role of sensations. Surely he doesn't thing that we just bypass them? |
| 5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
| Full Idea: The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon". | |
| From: Stephen P. Schwartz (Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds [1977], §II) | |
| A reaction: The extension of "lemon" is the set of all lemons. At last, a clear explanation of the word 'intension'! The debate becomes clear - over whether the terms of a language are used in reference to ideas of properties (and substances?), or to external items. |
| 22118 | Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews] |
| Full Idea: The modern concept of the will is often said to originate with Augustine. | |
| From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.74 | |
| A reaction: I'm beginning to think that this is the source of the trouble. How can a thing be intrinsically free? Surely freedom is always a contextual concept? |
| 4348 | Love, and do what you will [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: Love, and do what you will. | |
| From: Augustine (works [c.415]) | |
| A reaction: This sounds libertarian, but Augustine had a stern concept of what love required. It nicely captures one of the essential ideas of virtue ethics. |
| 7821 | Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Augustine claimed that the pagan schools between them had produced nearly three hundred different definitions of the highest good. | |
| From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: I would expect the right definition to be in there somewhere, but no doubt Augustine's definition made it 301. Perhaps the biggest problem of human life is that (as with the Kennedy assassination) proliferating stories obscure the true story. |
| 22119 | Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews] |
| Full Idea: Augustine insisted that 'ought' does not, in any straightforward way, imply 'can' - which distinguishes him from most modern ethicists. | |
| From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.74 | |
| A reaction: Not unreasonable. I ought to help my ailing friend who lives abroad, but I haven't the time or money to do it. We can experience impossibilities as duties. Impossibilities are just excuses. Augustine is opposing the Pelagian heresy. |
| 15863 | The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton] |
| Full Idea: When I wrote my treatise about our system, I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men, for the belief of a deity. | |
| From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1692.12.10) | |
| A reaction: Harré quotes this, and it shows that the rather passive view of nature Newton developed was to be supplemented by the active power of God. Without God, we need a more active view of nature. |
| 8340 | I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton] |
| Full Idea: You sometimes speak of gravity as essential and inherent in matter. Pray do no ascribe that notion to me; for the cause of gravity is what I do not pretend to know. | |
| From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.01.17) | |
| A reaction: I take science to be a two-stage operation - first we discern the regularities, and then we explain them. Evolution was spotted, then explained by Darwin. Cancer from cigarettes was spotted, but hasn't been explained. Regularity is the beginning. |
| 13150 | The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton] |
| Full Idea: The motions which the planets now have could not spring from any natural cause alone, but were impressed by an intelligent agent. | |
| From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1692.12.10) | |
| A reaction: He is writing to a cleric, but seems to be quite sincere about this. Elsewhere he just says he doesn't know what causes gravity. |
| 12178 | That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton] |
| Full Idea: That gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter ...is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. | |
| From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.02.25) | |
| A reaction: He is replying to some sermons, and he pays vague lip service to a possible divine force. Nevertheless, this is thoroughgoing anti-essentialism, and he talks of external 'laws' in the next sentence. Newton still sought the cause of gravity. |
| 22116 | Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews] |
| Full Idea: Augustine did the most to define Christian heresy. The three most prominent were Donatism, Pelagianism (that humans are perfectible), and Manicheism (that good and evil are equally basic metaphysical realities). | |
| From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Gareth B. Matthews - Augustine p.73 | |
| A reaction: Manicheans had presumably been studying Empedocles. (I suppose it's too late to identify Christianity as a heresy?). |
| 19338 | Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins] |
| Full Idea: Augustine solution to the problem of evil was to say that, strictly speaking, evil does not exist. Human beings are not part evil and part good, but rather just a limited amount of goodness. | |
| From: report of Augustine (works [c.415]) by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III | |
| A reaction: Augustine was rebelling against Manicheanism, which he espoused when young, which proposed a good and an evil force. An apathetic slob seems devoid of goodness, but is not evil. It takes extra effort to perform active evil. |