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All the ideas for 'The Theory of Communicative Action', 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics' and 'Philosophy of Language'

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
20962 Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie]
     Full Idea: Habermas is concerned to avoid the traumas of modern German history by making democracy an integral part of philosophy.
     From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy Conc 'Habermas'
     A reaction: Hence Habermas's emphasis on communication as central to language, which is central to philosophy. Modern philosophy departments are amazingly hierarchical.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
15670 The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson]
     Full Idea: For Habermas, the task of what he calls 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to be a stand-in and interpreter for the specialized sciences.
     From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.5:65
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
15665 We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson]
     Full Idea: Habermas claims to have embarked upon a new way of doing social philosophy, one that begins from an analysis of language use and that locates the rational basis of the coordination of action in speech.
     From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:28
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
20573 Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala]
     Full Idea: Instead of Enlightenment instrumental rationality (criticised by Adorno and Horkheimer), Habermas emphasizes 'communicative rationality', which makes critical discussion and mutual understanding possible.
     From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.6
     A reaction: There was a good reason not to smoke cigarettes, before we found out what it is. In one sense, reasons are in the world. This is interesting, but I feel analytic vertigo, as the lovely concept of 'rationality' becomes blurred and diffused.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
15163 The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
     Full Idea: The chief philosophical interest in quantified modal logic lies with metaphysical necessity, essentialism, and the nontrivial modal de re.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1)
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
15158 Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
     Full Idea: The indefinite description in 'A man will meet you' is naturally treated as quantificational, but an occurrence in predicative position, in 'Jones is not a philosopher', doesn't have a natural quantificational counterpart.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.23)
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
15157 Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
     Full Idea: Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, rather than a singular term, is a real insight.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22)
     A reaction: 'Would the man who threw the stone come forward' seems like a different usage from 'would the man in the black hat come forward'.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15156 The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
     Full Idea: Since Frege and Russell were mainly interested in formalizing mathematics, the only quantifiers they needed were the universal and existential one.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
6472 Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
     Full Idea: Continuity is not a sufficient criterion of material identity; it is sufficient in many cases, such as rocks and tables, where the appearances change slowly, but in others, such as the parts of an approximately homogeneous fluid, it fails us utterly.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI)
     A reaction: It might be debatable to what extent the 'parts' of a homogeneous fluid have identity. How many 'parts' are there in a glass of water? This seems, now, a problem for internalists; externalists can define the identity by the unseen molecules.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
6473 Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]
     Full Idea: We may lay down the following definition: Physical things are those series of appearances whose matter obeys the laws of physics.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI)
     A reaction: We will then have to define the laws of physic without making any reference to 'physical things'. There is an obvious suspicion of circularity somewhere here. I find it very odd to define objects just in terms of their appearances.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
6465 We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
     Full Idea: It is not necessary to deny a substance or substratum underlying appearances; it is merely expedient (by the application of Occam's Razor) to abstain from asserting this unnecessary entity.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §V)
     A reaction: Russell then goes on to struggle heroically in attempts to give accounts of 'matter' and 'objects' entirely in terms of 'sense-data'. If he failed, as many think he did, should we go back to belief in Aristotelian substance?
6471 The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
     Full Idea: The assumption of permanent substance, which technically underlies the procedure of physics, cannot of course be regarded as metaphysically legitimate.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI)
     A reaction: It is a moot point whether physicists still thought this way after the full arrival of quantum theory in 1926. Russell raises all sorts of nice questions about the relationship between physics and philosophy here. I'm on Russell's side.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15162 We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
     Full Idea: Our understanding of metaphysical necessity is intuitive - drawn from our ordinary thought and talk.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1)
     A reaction: This, of course, is a good reason for analytic philosophers to dislike metaphysical necessity.
15161 There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
     Full Idea: The set of metaphysically necessary truths is larger than the set of logically necessary truths.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1)
     A reaction: Likewise, the set of logically possible truths is much larger than the set of metaphysically possible truths. If a truth is logically necessary, it will clearly be metaphysically necessary. Er, unless it is necessitated by daft logic...
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6466 Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
     Full Idea: The supreme maxim in scientific philosophising is this: Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VI)
     A reaction: This seems to represent Russell's first move (in 1914) into what looks like phenomenalism. One might ask what is the difference between 'logical constructions' and 'inferred entities'. The latter appear to have unity, so I prefer them.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
20961 What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie]
     Full Idea: Habermas claims that what is regarded as a priori changes with history. This is because the linguistic structures on which judgements depend are themselves part of history, not prior to it.
     From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy Conc 'Habermas'
     A reaction: This is an interesting style of argument generally only found in continental philosophers, because they see the problem as historical rather than timeless. Compare Idea 20595, which sees analyticity historically.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6467 No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
     Full Idea: No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII)
     A reaction: So a loud bang has to broken down into an almost infinite number of sound sensibilia - each one presumably the size of the apperture of a small ear. This is beginning to sound a bit silly.
6483 Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.1
     A reaction: I can't say that I had ever intepreted Russell in this way, but it is a wonderfully thought-provoking idea. All the time that I thought I was looking at a table, I was just looking at my own brain, and drawing an unspoken inference that a table caused it.
8244 Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
     Full Idea: Rather than oppose sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge, we should identify the sensibilia that are peculiar to science. This is what Russell did when he evoked sense-data, qualities devoid of all subjectivity.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by G Deleuze / F Guattari - What is Philosophy? 2.5
     A reaction: An interesting observation. Russell is striking for his lack of interest in theories of arts and ethics, and his whole work focuses on understanding the scientific view. What is involved in sensibilia is a key modern issue (e.g. McDowell).
6462 Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
     Full Idea: I regard sense-data as not mental, and as being, in fact, part of the actual subject-matter of physics.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III)
     A reaction: Russell had clearly given himself an ontological problem with the introduction of sense-data, and this is his drastic solution. In 1912 his account seems ambiguous between sense-data being mental and being physical.
6463 Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
     Full Idea: Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware; it does not contain the subject as a part, as for example beliefs and volitions do.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV)
     A reaction: This very firmly rejects any notion that a sense-datum is mental. It is a left as a strange sort of object which gets as close as it is possible to get to the 'borders' of the mind, without actually becoming part of it.
6464 Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
     Full Idea: The sense-datum is an external object of which in sensation the subject is aware; it is true that the sense-datum is in many cases in the subject's body, but the subject's body is as distinct from the subject as tables and chairs are.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV)
     A reaction: This is probably Russell's clearest statement of the nature of sense-data, which are objects within the subjects body, but are not part of the mind. So once again we come up against the question of their ontology. Are they made of neurons?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
6459 We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
     Full Idea: We do not know, except by means of more or less precarious inferences, whether the objects which are at one time sense-data continue to exist at times when they are not data.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II)
     A reaction: Note that he actually refers to sense-data as 'objects'. It shows how thoroughly reified they are in his theory if they have the possibility of independent existence. This invites the question 'what are they made of?'
6460 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
     Full Idea: I shall give the name 'sensibilia' to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without necessarily being data to any mind.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III)
     A reaction: This is his response to the problem of whether sense-data can exist independently of experience, which was unclear in 1912. Presumably sensibilia are objects which are possible sources of experience, but that seems to cover most objects.
6461 Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
     Full Idea: We cannot ask, 'Can sense-data exist without being given?' for that is like asking, 'Can husbands exist without being married?'
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III)
     A reaction: This follows hard on Idea 6460, which introduces the idea of 'sensibilia' for things which are like sense-data, but are not 'given'. This is a new distinction in 1914, which he had not made in 1912.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6458 Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
     Full Idea: There is some difficulty in deciding what is to be considered one sense-datum: often attention causes divisions to appear where, so far as can be discovered, there were no divisions before.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II)
     A reaction: This was, I suspect, why Russell had dropped the idea of sense-data by 1921. He does, however, say that they are the last unit in analysis, rather than being the most basic unit of perception. In other words, they are purely theoretical.
6469 Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
     Full Idea: One reason often alleged for the subjectivity of sense-data is that the appearance of a thing itself may change when we find it hard to suppose that the thing itself has changed - as when we shut our eyes, or screw them up to make things look double.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VIII)
     A reaction: Russell firmly denies that they are subjective. These examples are also said to support to proposed existence of sense-data in the first place, since they show the gap between appearance and reality.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
15667 To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas]
     Full Idea: We understand the meaning of a speech act when we know what would make it acceptable.
     From: Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981], I:297), quoted by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:37
     A reaction: Finlayson glosses this as requiring the reasons which would justify the speech act.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
15668 Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson]
     Full Idea: On Habermas's view, meanings are not determined by the speaker's relation to the external world, but by his relation to his interlocutors; meaning is essentially intersubjective.
     From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:38
     A reaction: This view is not the same as Grice's, but it is clearly much closer to Grice than to (say) the Frege/Davidson emphasis on truth-conditions. I'm not sure if I would know how to begin arbitrating between the two views!
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
15152 To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
     Full Idea: The systematic study of meaning requires a framework for specifying the truth conditions of sentences on the basis of their syntactic structure, and the representational contents of their parts.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro)
     A reaction: Soames presents this as common sense, on the first page of his book, and it is hard to disagree. Representation will shade off into studying the workings of the mind. Fodor seems a good person to start with.
15153 Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
     Full Idea: The truth conditions provided by Tarski's theories (based on references of subsentential constituents) are too weak to determine meanings, because they lacked context-sensitivity and various forms of intensionality.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro)
     A reaction: Interesting. This suggests that stronger modern axiomatic theories of truth might give a sufficient basis for a truth conditions theory of meaning. Soames says possible worlds semantics was an attempt to improve things.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
15154 We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
     Full Idea: Instead of explaining the representationality of sentences and cognitive states in terms of propositions, we must explain the representationality of propositions in terms of the representationality of the relevant cognitive states.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro)
     A reaction: Music to my ears. I am bewildered by this Russellian notion of a 'proposition' as some abstract entity floating around in the world waiting to be expressed. The vaguer word 'facts' (and false facts?) will cover that. It's Frege's fault.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
15669 People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson]
     Full Idea: The ideal of equality, universality, and inclusiveness are inscribed in the communicative practices of the lifeworld, and agents, merely by virtue of communicating, conform to them.
     From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.4:60
     A reaction: This summary of Habermas's social views strikes me as thoroughly Kantian. It is something like the ideals of the Kingdom of Ends, necessarily implemented in a liberal society. Habermas emphasises the social, where Kant starts from the liberal.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
23416 Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: Habermas thinks political deliberation is required precisely because in its absence people will tend to accept existing practices as given, and thereby perpetuate false needs.
     From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Will Kymlicka - Community 'need'
     A reaction: If the dream is healthy and intelligent progress, it is not clear where that should come from. The problem with state involvement in the authority and power of the state. Locals are often prejudiced, so the intermediate level may be best.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
6470 Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
     Full Idea: We offer the following tentative definition: The matter of a given thing is the limit of its appearances as their distance from the thing diminishes.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IX)
     A reaction: This strikes me as empiricism gone mad. Russell is famous for being a 'realist', but you would hardly know it at this point. Personally I put emphasis on 'best explanation', which fairly simply delivers most of our commonsense understandings of reality.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
6468 There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]
     Full Idea: In addition to the private spaces, ..there is the 'space of perspectives', since each private world may be regarded as the appearance which the universe presents from a certain point of view.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII)
     A reaction: This replaces his concept of 'public space', which he introduced in 1912. Russell gradually dropped this, but I like the idea that we somehow directly perceive space in two ways simultaneously (which led him to say that space is six-dimensional).