62 ideas
| 20962 | Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: Habermas is concerned to avoid the traumas of modern German history by making democracy an integral part of philosophy. | |
| From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy Conc 'Habermas' | |
| A reaction: Hence Habermas's emphasis on communication as central to language, which is central to philosophy. Modern philosophy departments are amazingly hierarchical. |
| 15670 | The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
| Full Idea: For Habermas, the task of what he calls 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to be a stand-in and interpreter for the specialized sciences. | |
| From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.5:65 |
| 15665 | We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
| Full Idea: Habermas claims to have embarked upon a new way of doing social philosophy, one that begins from an analysis of language use and that locates the rational basis of the coordination of action in speech. | |
| From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:28 |
| 20573 | Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala] |
| Full Idea: Instead of Enlightenment instrumental rationality (criticised by Adorno and Horkheimer), Habermas emphasizes 'communicative rationality', which makes critical discussion and mutual understanding possible. | |
| From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: There was a good reason not to smoke cigarettes, before we found out what it is. In one sense, reasons are in the world. This is interesting, but I feel analytic vertigo, as the lovely concept of 'rationality' becomes blurred and diffused. |
| 17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: As Kreisel has remarked, what is important is not the existence of mathematical objects, but the objectivity of mathematical statements. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: [see Maddy 2011:115 for the history of this idea] It seems rather unclear where Frege stands on objectivity. Maddy embraces it, following up this idea, and Tyler Burge's fat book on objectivity. |
| 9724 | Until the 1960s the only semantics was truth-tables [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: Until the 1960s standard truth-table semantics were the only ones that there were. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.10.1) | |
| A reaction: The 1960s presumably marked the advent of possible worlds. |
| 9703 | 'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of objects having a relation [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: 'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of a relation, that is, the set of all objects that are members of ordered pairs and that have that relation. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9705 | 'fld R' indicates the 'field' of all objects in the relation [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: 'fld R' indicates the 'field' of a relation, that is, the set of all objects that are members of ordered pairs on either side of the relation. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9704 | 'ran R' indicates the 'range' of objects being related to [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: 'ran R' indicates the 'range' of a relation, that is, the set of all objects that are members of ordered pairs and that are related to by the first objects. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9710 | We write F:A→B to indicate that A maps into B (the output of F on A is in B) [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: We write F : A → B to indicate that A maps into B, that is, the domain of relating things is set A, and the things related to are all in B. If we add that F = B, then A maps 'onto' B. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9707 | 'F(x)' is the unique value which F assumes for a value of x [Enderton] |
|
Full Idea:
F(x) is a 'function', which indicates the unique value which y takes in |
|
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9712 | A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair has the relation in both directions [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair in the set has the relation in both directions. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9713 | A relation is 'transitive' if it can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: A relation is 'transitive' on a set if the relation can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9699 | The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set. Thus: PA = {x : x ⊆ A}. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9700 | Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty (i.e. they have no members in common). | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9702 | A 'domain' of a relation is the set of members of ordered pairs in the relation [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: The 'domain' of a relation is the set of all objects that are members of ordered pairs that are members of the relation. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9701 | A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs. The ordering relation on the numbers 0-3 is captured by - in fact it is - the set of ordered pairs {<0,1>,<0,2>,<0,3>,<1,2>,<1,3>,<2,3>}. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) | |
| A reaction: This can't quite be a definition of order among numbers, since it relies on the notion of a 'ordered' pair. |
| 9706 | A 'function' is a relation in which each object is related to just one other object [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: A 'function' is a relation which is single-valued. That is, for each object, there is only one object in the function set to which that object is related. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9708 | A function 'maps A into B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are all in B [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: A function 'maps A into B' if the domain of relating things is set A, and the things related to are all in B. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9709 | A function 'maps A onto B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are set B [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: A function 'maps A onto B' if the domain of relating things is set A, and the things related to are set B. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9711 | A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member bears the relation to itself [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member of the set bears the relation to itself. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9714 | A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' if all pairs are either relations, or contain identical objects [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' on a set if every ordered pair is related (in either direction), or the objects are identical. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9717 | A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: A classic reduction is the class of ordered pairs <x,y> being reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}}. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) |
| 9715 | An 'equivalence relation' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: An 'equivalence relation' is a binary relation which is reflexive, and symmetric, and transitive. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 9716 | We 'partition' a set into distinct subsets, according to each relation on its objects [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: Equivalence classes will 'partition' a set. That is, it will divide it into distinct subsets, according to each relation on the set. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0) |
| 10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: We may suppose that with each set is associated an object as its cardinal number, but we have no systematic way, without appeal to the Axiom of Choice, of selecting a representative set of each cardinality. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) |
| 9722 | Inference not from content, but from the fact that it was said, is 'conversational implicature' [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: The process is dubbed 'conversational implicature' when the inference is not from the content of what has been said, but from the fact that it has been said. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.7.3) |
| 9718 | Validity is either semantic (what preserves truth), or proof-theoretic (following procedures) [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: The point of logic is to give an account of the notion of validity,..in two standard ways: the semantic way says that a valid inference preserves truth (symbol |=), and the proof-theoretic way is defined in terms of purely formal procedures (symbol |-). | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.1.3..) | |
| A reaction: This division can be mirrored in mathematics, where it is either to do with counting or theorising about things in the physical world, or following sets of rules from axioms. Language can discuss reality, or play word-games. |
| 9721 | A logical truth or tautology is a logical consequence of the empty set [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: A is a logical truth (tautology) (|= A) iff it is a semantic consequence of the empty set of premises (φ |= A), that is, every interpretation makes A true. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.3.4) | |
| A reaction: So the final column of every line of the truth table will be T. |
| 9994 | A truth assignment to the components of a wff 'satisfy' it if the wff is then True [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: A truth assignment 'satisfies' a formula, or set of formulae, if it evaluates as True when all of its components have been assigned truth values. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: [very roughly what Enderton says!] The concept becomes most significant when a large set of wff's is pronounced 'satisfied' after a truth assignment leads to them all being true. |
| 9719 | A proof theory is 'sound' if its valid inferences entail semantic validity [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: If every proof-theoretically valid inference is semantically valid (so that |- entails |=), the proof theory is said to be 'sound'. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.1.7) |
| 9720 | A proof theory is 'complete' if semantically valid inferences entail proof-theoretic validity [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: If every semantically valid inference is proof-theoretically valid (so that |= entails |-), the proof-theory is said to be 'complete'. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.1.7) |
| 9995 | Proof in finite subsets is sufficient for proof in an infinite set [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: If a wff is tautologically implied by a set of wff's, it is implied by a finite subset of them; and if every finite subset is satisfiable, then so is the whole set of wff's. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: [Enderton's account is more symbolic] He adds that this also applies to models. It is a 'theorem' because it can be proved. It is a major theorem in logic, because it brings the infinite under control, and who doesn't want that? |
| 9996 | Expressions are 'decidable' if inclusion in them (or not) can be proved [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: A set of expressions is 'decidable' iff there exists an effective procedure (qv) that, given some expression, will decide whether or not the expression is included in the set (i.e. doesn't contradict it). | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.7) | |
| A reaction: This is obviously a highly desirable feature for a really reliable system of expressions to possess. All finite sets are decidable, but some infinite sets are not. |
| 9997 | For a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can always be enumerated [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: The Enumerability Theorem says that for a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can be effectively enumerated. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: There are criteria for what makes a 'reasonable' language (probably specified to ensure enumerability!). Predicates and functions must be decidable, and the language must be finite. |
| 10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: In the intuitionist view, the notion of an intuitive proof cannot be expected to coincide with that of a proof in a formal system, and Gödel's incompleteness theorem is thus unsurprising from an intuitionist point of view. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) |
| 10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: From the intuitionist point of view natural numbers are mental constructions, so their totality is only potential, but it is neverthless a fully determinate totality. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: This could only be if the means of constructing the numbers was fully determinate, so how does that situation come about? |
| 10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
| Full Idea: Dummett distinguishes, roughly, between those concrete objects which can be possible objects of ostension, and abstract objects which can only be referred to by functional expressions whose argument is some other object. | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.3.II | |
| A reaction: At least someone has proposed a theory! Hale gives a nice critical discussion of the proposal. It is a moot point whether in the second case, when you pick out the 'other object', you are thereby able to refer to some new abstract object. |
| 10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The dichotomy between concrete and abstract objects comes to seem far too crude: to which of the two categories should we assign the Mistral, for instance? | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: He has previously given colours and points as difficult borderline cases. We can generalise this particular problem case as the question of whether a potentiality or possibility is abstract or concrete. |
| 10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: There is no reason for wanting a sharp distinction between concrete and abstract objects. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: This rather depends on your ontology. If you are happy for reality to be full of weird non-physical entities, then the blurring won't bother you. If the boundary is blurred but still real, it is a very interesting one. |
| 10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: If abstractions were defined by whether they could affect human sense-organs, light-waves would be concrete but radio waves abstract. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: This is a pretty good baseline example. No account should draw an abstract/concrete line through the electromagnetic spectrum. |
| 10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The dictum that a name has meaning only in the context of a sentence repudiates the conception of a special philosophical sense of 'existence', which claims that numbers do not exist while affirming existential statements about them. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: He refers to Frege's Context Principle. Personally I would say you could make plenty of 'affirmations' about arithmetic without them having to be 'existential'. I can say there 'is' a number between 6 and 8, without huge existential claims. |
| 10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: What objects we recognise the world as containing depends upon the structure of our language. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: The background to this claim is the Fregean idea that there are no objects for us if there are no concepts. Dummett is adding that there are no concepts if there is no language. I say animals have concepts and recognise objects. |
| 10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: It is by the study of the character of predication that we shall come to understand the essential nature of universals. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: I haven't founded a clearer manifesto for linguistic philosophy than that! Personally I find it highly dubious, given the shifting nature of linguistic forms, and the enormous variation between remote languages. |
| 10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The original sense of 'nominalism' is the denial of universals, that is the denial of reference to either predicates or to abstract nouns. The modern sense (of Nelson Goodman) is the denial of the existence of abstract objects. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: This is why you find loads of modern philosophers vigorous attacking nominalism, only to gradually realise that they don't actually believe in universals, as traditionally understood. It's hard to keep up, when words shift their meaning. |
| 10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: We cannot simply distinguish concrete objects as objects of ostension, if it literally involves a pointing gesture, as this would exclude a colourless gas, a sound or a smell. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: He shifts to verbal ostension as a result, since we can talk of 'this smell'. On p.491 he suggests that affecting our senses is a sufficient condition to be concrete, but not a necessary one. |
| 10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: To say that an abstract object cannot be the cause of change seems plausible enough, but the thesis that it cannot be the subject of change is problematic. The shape of an object can change, or the number of sheep on a hill. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: This seems a pretty crucial difficulty for the standard notion of abstracta as non-causal. I would say that it is an acid which could eat away the whole edifice if you thought about it for long enough. He shifts shape-change to the physical object. |
| 10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: For intuitionists, it ceases to be true that abstract objects are not observable and cannot be involved in causal interaction, since such intuitive apprehension of them may be regarded as just such an interaction. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: I would say that since abstract objects can be involved in causal interactions, in the mind, and since the mind is entirely physical (oh yes), this makes abstract objects entirely physical, which may come as a shock to some people. |
| 10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: For an object to be abstract, we require only that an understanding of any name of that object involves a recognition that the object is in the range of some functional expression. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but a function must involve a relation between some objects, such that a unique object is consequently picked out. |
| 10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
| Full Idea: Dummett's best argument for excluding abstract nouns relies upon the entirely Fregean requirement that with any genuine singular term there must be associated a criterion of identity. | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973]) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.2.II | |
| A reaction: This sounds a rather rigid test. Must the criteria be logically precise, or must you just have some vague idea of what you are talking about? |
| 10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: An abstract object can be referred to only by means of a verbal phrase, ...and no confrontation with an abstract object is possible. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: So does this mean that animals are incapable of entertaining abstract concepts? Some research suggests otherwise. Does a dog understand what a 'walk' is, without use of the word? Dummett disgracefully neglects animals in his theories. |
| 10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: The notion of 'object', as it is now commonly used in philosophical contexts, is a modern notion, one first introduced by Frege. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: If we say 'objects exist', I think it is crucial that if we are going to introduce 'object' as a term of art, then 'exist' had better stick to normal usage. If that drifts into a term of art as well (incorporating 'subsist', or some such) we have no hope! |
| 9723 | Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton] |
| Full Idea: Not all sentences using 'if' are conditionals. Consider 'if you want a banana, there is one in the kitchen'. The rough test is that a conditional can be rewritten as 'that A implies that B'. | |
| From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.6.4) |
| 20961 | What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: Habermas claims that what is regarded as a priori changes with history. This is because the linguistic structures on which judgements depend are themselves part of history, not prior to it. | |
| From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy Conc 'Habermas' | |
| A reaction: This is an interesting style of argument generally only found in continental philosophers, because they see the problem as historical rather than timeless. Compare Idea 20595, which sees analyticity historically. |
| 19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Real functions map objects onto objects, but concepts map objects onto truth value, ...so Dummett says that concepts are not functions, but that they have a 'functional character'. | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 6 |
| 10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Since we cannot pick an abstract object out from its surrounding, all that we need to master is the use of statements of identity between objects of a certain kind. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: This is the necessary Fregean preliminary to using a principle of abstraction to identify two objects which are abstract (when the two objects are in an equivalence relation). Presumably circular squares and square circles are identical? |
| 15667 | To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas] |
| Full Idea: We understand the meaning of a speech act when we know what would make it acceptable. | |
| From: Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981], I:297), quoted by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:37 | |
| A reaction: Finlayson glosses this as requiring the reasons which would justify the speech act. |
| 15668 | Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
| Full Idea: On Habermas's view, meanings are not determined by the speaker's relation to the external world, but by his relation to his interlocutors; meaning is essentially intersubjective. | |
| From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:38 | |
| A reaction: This view is not the same as Grice's, but it is clearly much closer to Grice than to (say) the Frege/Davidson emphasis on truth-conditions. I'm not sure if I would know how to begin arbitrating between the two views! |
| 10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
| Full Idea: Dummett claims that a realistic conception of reference can be sustained for concrete objects (possible objects of ostension), but breaks down for (putative) names of (pure) abstract objects. | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.3.II | |
| A reaction: An extremely hard claim to evaluate, because a case must first be made for abstract objects which are fundamentally different in kind. Realistic reference must certainly deal with these hard cases. Field rejects Dummett's abstract points. |
| 15669 | People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
| Full Idea: The ideal of equality, universality, and inclusiveness are inscribed in the communicative practices of the lifeworld, and agents, merely by virtue of communicating, conform to them. | |
| From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.4:60 | |
| A reaction: This summary of Habermas's social views strikes me as thoroughly Kantian. It is something like the ideals of the Kingdom of Ends, necessarily implemented in a liberal society. Habermas emphasises the social, where Kant starts from the liberal. |
| 23416 | Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Habermas thinks political deliberation is required precisely because in its absence people will tend to accept existing practices as given, and thereby perpetuate false needs. | |
| From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Will Kymlicka - Community 'need' | |
| A reaction: If the dream is healthy and intelligent progress, it is not clear where that should come from. The problem with state involvement in the authority and power of the state. Locals are often prejudiced, so the intermediate level may be best. |