13 ideas
20962 | Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie] |
Full Idea: Habermas is concerned to avoid the traumas of modern German history by making democracy an integral part of philosophy. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy Conc 'Habermas' | |
A reaction: Hence Habermas's emphasis on communication as central to language, which is central to philosophy. Modern philosophy departments are amazingly hierarchical. |
15670 | The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: For Habermas, the task of what he calls 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to be a stand-in and interpreter for the specialized sciences. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.5:65 |
21546 | We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell] |
Full Idea: Whoever is afraid of symbols can hardly hope to acquire exact ideas where it is necessary to distinguish 1) the variable in itself as opposed to its value, 2) any value of the variable, 3) all values, 4) some value. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.84) | |
A reaction: Not the best example, perhaps, of the need for precision, but a nice illustration of the new attitude Russell brought into philosophy. |
15665 | We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: Habermas claims to have embarked upon a new way of doing social philosophy, one that begins from an analysis of language use and that locates the rational basis of the coordination of action in speech. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:28 |
20573 | Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala] |
Full Idea: Instead of Enlightenment instrumental rationality (criticised by Adorno and Horkheimer), Habermas emphasizes 'communicative rationality', which makes critical discussion and mutual understanding possible. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.6 | |
A reaction: There was a good reason not to smoke cigarettes, before we found out what it is. In one sense, reasons are in the world. This is interesting, but I feel analytic vertigo, as the lovely concept of 'rationality' becomes blurred and diffused. |
21531 | Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell] |
Full Idea: Meinong's theory says that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true, while Russell's says that this assertion is false. The average man, if he knows his mythology, would probably agree with Meinong. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.19 | |
A reaction: It seems obvious that some disambiguation is needed here. Assenting to that assertion would be blatantly contextual. No one backs Pegasus at a race track. |
21545 | I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell] |
Full Idea: I should prefer to say that there is no such object as 'the round square'. The difficulties of excluding such objects can, I think, be avoided by the theory of denoting. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.81) | |
A reaction: The 'theory of denoting' is his brand new theory of definite descriptions, which makes implicit claims of existence explicit, so that they can be judged. Why can't we just say that a round square can be an intentional object, but not a real object? |
20961 | What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie] |
Full Idea: Habermas claims that what is regarded as a priori changes with history. This is because the linguistic structures on which judgements depend are themselves part of history, not prior to it. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy Conc 'Habermas' | |
A reaction: This is an interesting style of argument generally only found in continental philosophers, because they see the problem as historical rather than timeless. Compare Idea 20595, which sees analyticity historically. |
14470 | Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim] |
Full Idea: The general principle of explanatory exclusion states that two or more complete and independent explanations of the same event or phenomenon cannot coexist. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Mechanism, purpose and explan. exclusion [1989], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a rather optimistic view of explanations, with a strong element of reality involved. I would have thought there were complete explanations at different 'levels', which were complementary to one another. |
15667 | To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas] |
Full Idea: We understand the meaning of a speech act when we know what would make it acceptable. | |
From: Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981], I:297), quoted by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:37 | |
A reaction: Finlayson glosses this as requiring the reasons which would justify the speech act. |
15668 | Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: On Habermas's view, meanings are not determined by the speaker's relation to the external world, but by his relation to his interlocutors; meaning is essentially intersubjective. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:38 | |
A reaction: This view is not the same as Grice's, but it is clearly much closer to Grice than to (say) the Frege/Davidson emphasis on truth-conditions. I'm not sure if I would know how to begin arbitrating between the two views! |
15669 | People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: The ideal of equality, universality, and inclusiveness are inscribed in the communicative practices of the lifeworld, and agents, merely by virtue of communicating, conform to them. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.4:60 | |
A reaction: This summary of Habermas's social views strikes me as thoroughly Kantian. It is something like the ideals of the Kingdom of Ends, necessarily implemented in a liberal society. Habermas emphasises the social, where Kant starts from the liberal. |
23416 | Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Habermas thinks political deliberation is required precisely because in its absence people will tend to accept existing practices as given, and thereby perpetuate false needs. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Will Kymlicka - Community 'need' | |
A reaction: If the dream is healthy and intelligent progress, it is not clear where that should come from. The problem with state involvement in the authority and power of the state. Locals are often prejudiced, so the intermediate level may be best. |