Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Platonistic Theories of Universals', 'The Evolution of Physics' and 'Frege'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor

8964	Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
	Full Idea: There are two ways that entities can be multiplied unnecessarily: by multiplying the number of explanatory categories, and by multiplying the number of entities within a category.
	From: J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz (Platonistic Theories of Universals [2003], 4)
	A reaction: An important distinction. The orthodox view is that it is the excess of categories that is to be avoided (e.g. by nominalists). Possible worlds in metaphysics, and multiple worlds in physics, claim not to violate the first case.

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic

7726	Aristotelian logic dealt with inferences about concepts, and there were also proposition inferences [Weiner]
	Full Idea: Till the nineteenth century, it was a common view that Aristotelian logic could evaluate inferences whose validity was based on relations between concepts, while propositional logic could evaluate inferences based on relations between propositions.
	From: Joan Weiner (Frege [1999], Ch.3)
	A reaction: Venn diagrams relate closely to Aristotelian syllogisms, as each concept is represented by a circle, and shows relations between sets. Arrows seem needed to represent how to go from one proposition to another. Is one static, the other dynamic?

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals

8962	'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
	Full Idea: The example which presents the most serious challenge to nominalism is 'there are shapes which are never exemplified'.
	From: J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz (Platonistic Theories of Universals [2003], 3)
	A reaction: To 'exemplify' a shape must it be a physical object, or a drawing of such an object, or a description? If none of those have ever existed, I'm not sure what 'are' is supposed to mean. They seem to be possibilia (with all the associated problems).

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism

8961	Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
	Full Idea: The two main motivations for nominalism are an admirable commitment to Ockham's Razor, and a queasiness about postulating entities that are unobservable or non-empirical, existing in a non-physical realm.
	From: J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz (Platonistic Theories of Universals [2003], 3)
	A reaction: It doesn't follow that because the entities are unobservable that they are non-physical. Consider the 'interior' of an electron. Neverless I share a love of Ockham's Razor and a deep caution about unobservables.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

8963	Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
	Full Idea: There are four models of the ontological status of possible worlds: conceptualist (mental constructions), combinatorial (all combinations of the actual world), abstract worlds (conjunction of propositions), and concrete worlds (collections of concreta).
	From: J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz (Platonistic Theories of Universals [2003], 4)
	A reaction: [the proponents cited are, in order, Rescher, Cresswell, Plantinga and Lewis] They dismiss Rescher and Cresswell, both of whom seem to me more plausible than Plantinga or Lewis. 'Possible' can't figure in the definition. Possible to us, or in reality?

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields

18202	The concept of a field gradually replaced the substances in explaining relations between charges [Einstein/Infeld]
	Full Idea: In the beginning the field concept was no more than a means of facilitating the understanding of phenomena. ...In the new field language it is the field and not the charges themselves which is essential. The substance was overshadowed by the field.
	From: Einstein,A/Infeld,L (The Evolution of Physics [1938], p.151), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.4
	A reaction: This is very important for philosophical metaphysicians, especially those like me who want to explain the universe by the nature of the stuff that composes it. The 'stuff' had better not be simplistic individual 'substances'.