10 ideas
23269 | Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen] |
Full Idea: True philosophers concern themselves first and foremost to take clearly observed facts as their point of departure. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170], Kiv.11.817) | |
A reaction: I love this one, especially the desire that the facts be 'clearly observed'. That, thank goodness, eliminates quantum mechanics. If you don't love history and the physical sciences, you are not a philosopher. Oh, and reliable gossip. |
16661 | There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Is it not now clear what the difference is between items in the categories? Some serve to refer to a thing, whereas others serve to refer to the circumstances of a thing. | |
From: Boethius (Concerning the Trinity [c.518], Ch. 4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.5 |
20945 | Belief is no more rational than is tasting and smelling [Hamann] |
Full Idea: Belief happens as little in terms of reasons as tasting and smelling. | |
From: J.G. Hamann (works [1770], v2:74), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy | |
A reaction: That is one idea definitively expressed! I take it as only a partial truth. Beliefs happen as a result of observation and experience. But someone can draw our attention to something (and we can hunt it out ourselves), which is giving a reason for belief. |
23266 | The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen] |
Full Idea: The spirited part of the soul is desiderative of freedom, victory, power, authority, reputation, and honour. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170], Kiv.2.772) | |
A reaction: This is the concept of 'thumos' [spirit], taken straight from Plato's tripartite account of the soul, in 'Republic'. Note that it includes a desire for freedom (in an age of slavery). |
23219 | Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb] |
Full Idea: Even when an animals heart was stopped [by hand] it continued its muted whimpers, …but when the brain was pressed the animal stopped making a noise and became unconscious. | |
From: report of Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170]) by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 1 | |
A reaction: It's not that the ancients didn't do science. It's that ancient people paid no attention to what their scientists discovered. |
23264 | Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen] |
Full Idea: Philosophers conceive of faculties as things which inhabit 'substances' much as we inhabit houses, not realising that causes of events are conceived in relational terms. We therefore attribute as many faculties to a substance as activities. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170], Kiv.2.769) | |
A reaction: This seems to demolish speculative faculties, but they were revived during the Enlightenment. I am happy to talk of 'philosophical faculties' where they are presumed to originate a type of thought, without commitment to any neuroscience. |
23220 | The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen] |
Full Idea: The brain is the principal organ of the psychical members. For within the brain is seated memory, reason and intellect, and from the brain is distributed the power, sensation and voluntary motion. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170]), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 1 | |
A reaction: [not sure of ref] Interesting that he assigns the whole of mind to the brain, and not just some aspect of it. He had done experiments. Understanding the role of the brain was amazingly slow. Impeded by religion, I guess. |
23265 | The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen] |
Full Idea: That part of the soul which we call rational is desiderative: …it desires truth, knowledge, learning, understanding, and recollection - in short, all the good things. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170], Kiv.2.772) | |
A reaction: Truth is no surprise, but recollection is. Note the separation of knowledge from understanding. This is a very good characterisation of rationality. For the Greeks it has a moral dimension, of wanting what is good. |
23268 | We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen] |
Full Idea: We kill the irredeemably wicked, for three reasons: that they may no longer harm us; as a deterrent to others like them; and because it is actually better from their own point of view to die, when their souls are so damaged they cannot be improved. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170], Kiv.11.816) | |
A reaction: The third one sounds like a dubious rationalisation, given that the prisoner probably disagrees. Nowadays we are not so quick to judge someone as irredeemable. The first one works when they run wild, but not after their capture. |
7666 | God is not a mathematician, but a poet [Hamann, by Berlin] |
Full Idea: Hamann's fundamental doctrine was that God was not a geometer, not a mathematician, but a poet. | |
From: report of J.G. Hamann (works [1770]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.3 | |
A reaction: [This idea is wonderfully expressed by D.H.Lawrence in his poem 'Red Geranium and Godly Mignonette]. The idea becomes attractive when you ask whether God would need to do mathematics. |