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9463
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Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette]
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Full Idea:
Classical logic (of Whitehead, Russell, Gödel, Church) is a two-valued system of propositional and predicate logic, in which all propositions are exclusively true or false, and quantification and predication are over existent objects only.
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From:
Dale Jacquette (Intro to I: Classical Logic [2002], p.9)
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A reaction:
All of these get challenged at some point, though the existence requirement is the one I find dubious.
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15797
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All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer]
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Full Idea:
I propose a dispositional ontology for the physical world, according to which a) every structural property is a dispositional one, b) a physical object is an ordered set of dispositions, and c) every event manifests a dispositional property of the world.
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From:
J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], Intro)
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A reaction:
Mumford says this is consistent with ontology as a way of describing the world, rather than being facts about the world. I like Fetzer's sketch, which sounds to have a lot in common with 'process philosophy'.
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12727
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It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
If it could be supposed that a body exists without a mind, then a man would do everything in the same way as if he did not have a mind, and men would speak and write the same things, without knowing what they do. ...But this supposition is impossible.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Paper of December 1676 [1676], A6.3.400), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5
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A reaction:
This is clearly the zombie dream, three centuries before Robert Kirk's modern invention of the idea. Leibniz's reason for denying the possibility of zombies won't be the modern physicalist reason.
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