10 ideas
| 19048 | Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Contextual definition precipitated a revolution in semantics. The primary vehicle of meaning is seen no longer as the word, but as the sentence. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Five Milestones of Empiricism [1975], p.69) | |
| A reaction: I think the idea is that the term is now supported entirely by its surrounding language, and not by its denotation of something in the world. |
| 19047 | Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful [Quine] |
| Full Idea: If Bentham found some term convenient but ontologically embarrassing, contextual definition enabled him in some cases to continue to enjoy the services of the term while disclaiming its denotation. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Five Milestones of Empiricism [1975], p.68) | |
| A reaction: In Quine's terms this would be to withdraw the term from the periphery of the theory, where it has to meet the world, and make it part of the inner connections of the theory. He suggests that Bentham invented this technique. |
| 15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
| Full Idea: I propose a dispositional ontology for the physical world, according to which a) every structural property is a dispositional one, b) a physical object is an ordered set of dispositions, and c) every event manifests a dispositional property of the world. | |
| From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Mumford says this is consistent with ontology as a way of describing the world, rather than being facts about the world. I like Fetzer's sketch, which sounds to have a lot in common with 'process philosophy'. |
| 15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
| Full Idea: Every atomic event in the world's history is a manifestation of some dispositional property of the world and every physical object is an instantiation of some set of dispositions; hence, every structural property is dispositional in kind. | |
| From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 5) | |
| A reaction: I quite like this drastic view, but there remains the intuition that there must always be something which has the disposition. That may be because I have not yet digested the lessons of modern physics. |
| 8970 | Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne] |
| Full Idea: Our conceptual grip on the notion of a set is founded on the axiom of extensionality: a set x is the same as a set y iff x and y have the same members. But this axiom deploys the notion of absolute identity ('same members'). | |
| From: John Hawthorne (Identity [2003], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Identity seems to be a primitive, useful and crucial concept, so don't ask what it is. I suspect that numbers can't get off the ground without it (especially, in view of the above, if you define numbers in terms of sets). |
| 19049 | In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning [Quine] |
| Full Idea: We have come to recognise that in a scientific theory even a whole sentence is ordinarily too short a text to serve as an independent vehicle of empirical meaning. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Five Milestones of Empiricism [1975], p.70) |
| 19046 | Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Since 1750 empiricism shows five turns for the better. First was a shift from ideas to words. Second a shift from terms to sentences. Third the shift to systems of sentences. Fourth the abandonment of analytic-synthetic dualism. Fifth was naturalism. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Five Milestones of Empiricism [1975], p.67) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Quine must be largely credited with the last two. The first four are almost entirely linguistic in character, which is characteristic of mid-twentieth-century empiricism. I would offer the recognition of explanation as central for the sixth. |
| 19050 | Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Holism blurs the supposed contrast beween the synthetic sentence, with its empirical content, and the analytic sentence, with its null content. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Five Milestones of Empiricism [1975], p.71) | |
| A reaction: This spells out nicely that Quine's rejection of the distinction is completely tied to his holistic view of language. The obvious phenomenon of compositionality (building sentence meaning in steps) counts against holism. |
| 15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
| Full Idea: Kinds of things are specific arrangements of dispositions. | |
| From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 2) | |
| A reaction: A 'disposition' doesn't seem quite the right word for what is basic to the physical world, though Harré and Madden make a good case for the 'fields' of physic being understood in that way. I prefer 'power', though that doesn't solve anything. |
| 15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |
| Full Idea: Lawlike sentences are conceived as logically general dispositional statements attributing permanent dispositional properties to every member of a reference class. ...Their basic form is that of subjunctive generalizations. | |
| From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 3) | |
| A reaction: I much prefer talk of 'lawlike sentences' to talk of 'laws'. At least they imply that the true generalisations about nature are fairly fine-grained. Why not talk of 'generalisations' instead of 'laws'? Fetzer wants dispositions to explain everything. |